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Abstract 
This study proposes to analyse in an exploratory way the state of innovation and production systems in Swiss 
biotechnology and especially its innovative capacity and related factors. As biotechnology as such cannot be 
considered as an industrial sector but rather as a set of technologies developed in the field of life sciences, the 
direct link with science makes innovative capacity a major determinant of competitiveness. 
While large multinationals, such as biopharmaceuticals, may not need local technology suppliers, the 
presence of a local industry of research-based firms and technology suppliers is critical, because the industry 
is, by itself, a major source of growth and social progress. 
 By observing how research and development (R&D) activities are organised in the field of biotechnology, 
we try to identify the relations existing between universities and the biotechnology industry, but also the 
relations between biotechnology firms among themselves. 
 
Contact authors at: 
J. Bart Carrin, JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) Geneva 
Rue de Lausanne 80, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland 
Tel: +41 22 732 1304, Fax: +41 22 732 0772 
E-mail : carrin@jetroge.ch 
 
Yuko Harayama, RIETI (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry) 
1-3-1, Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-8901, Japan 
Tel: +81-3-3501-8224, Fax: +81-3-3501-8414 
E-mail: harayama-yuko@rieti.go.jp 
 
J. Alexander K. Mack, University of Neuchâtel, Pierre-à-Mazel 7, 2000 Neuchâtel, Switzerland 
Tel: +41 32 718 1409, Fax: +41 32 718 14 01 
E-mail: alexander.mack@unine.ch 
 
Milad Zarin-Nejadan, University of Neuchâtel, Pierre-à-Mazel 7, 2000 Neuchâtel, Switzerland 
Tel: +41 32 718 1355, Fax: +41 32 718 1401 
E-mail: milad.zarin@unine.ch 
 
This project has been supported by the “Foreign technology trends commissioned research 









INTRODUCTION              1  
 
 
I Strategic  Alliances             3  
 
1.1  Definition and theory             3  
 
1.2  Critiques of prior research on alliances           5  
 
1.3 Research  partnerships             6  
 
1.4 Alliance  failures              7  
 
 
II Innovative  Clusters             8  
 
2.1  Definition and concept             8  
 
2.2 Theoretical  approaches             9  
 
2.3  Lessons from innovative clusters        1 0  
 
 
III  Science & Technology policy in Switzerland     1 3  
 
3.1 Introduction           1 3  
 
3.2  Higher education system in Switzerland       1 8  
 
  3.2.1  Federal government versus Cantonal government        18 
 3.2.2  Higher  education  structure  in  Switzerland      18 
 
3.3  Governmental institutions and programs       2 1  
 






   iii
IV  The Case of Swiss Biotechnology       2 6  
 
4.1 Definitions           2 6  
 
4.2  Biotechnology in Switzerland        2 6  
 
 4.2.1  Swiss  biotech  organizations        28 
 
4.3  Innovation in biotechnology       2 9  
 
 4.3.1  Overall  regulatory  stance        31 
 
4.4 International  comparisons         3 3  
 
 4.4.1  Biotechnology  and  patents        33 
 4.4.2  Biotechnology  and  bibliometrics       34 
 4.4.3  Biotechnology  and  trade        35 
 4.4.4  Biotechnology  and  government  funding      35 
 
 
V  Swiss Biotechnology: A Case Study       3 6  
 
5.1  The Basel region           3 6  
 
5.1.1  Actelion  Pharmaceuticals,  Ltd.       36 
5.1.2  F.  Hoffmann-La  Roche  AG        38 
5.1.3  E c o v a c   G m b H         3 9  
5.1.4  S p e e d e l   P h a r m a   A G          4 0  
5.1.5  Novartis  Pharma  AG         41 
 
5.2  The greater Zurich area         4 4  
 
5.2.1  GLYCART  Biotechnology  AG       44 
5.2.2  The  Genetics  Company,  Inc.        45 
5.2.3  E S B A T e c h   A G          4 7  
 
5.3  The Geneva-Lausanne area         4 8  
 
5.3.1  NovImmune  SA         48 
5.3.2  Apotech  Corporation         51 
5.3.3  Laboratory of Cellular Biotechnology, CBUE (EPFL)      52 
5.3.4  Department of Medical Biochemistry, University of Geneva    54 
 
5.4 Other  locations          5 5  
 
5.4.1  E U R O P R O T E O M E   A G         5 5  
5.4.2  ZLB Bioplasma AG         5 7  
 
 
   iv
VI Conclusions         5 9  
 
6.1  Starting a company          5 9  
 
6.2  Clusters and knowledge networks        6 0  
 
6.3 Institutional  factors          6 1  
 




ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS       6 4  
 
 
APPENDIX          6 6  
 
 

























   v




1-1  International  strategic  alliances          3 
1-2  International strategic technology alliances, by technology shares      3 
1-3  Alliance  failures            7 
 
3-1  Structure  of  S&T  policy         13 
3-2  Structure  of  higher  education         19 
 
4-1  Newly  established  companies       27 
4-2  Biotech  companies  by  type  of  activity       27 
4-3  Intramuros R&D expenditures in biotechnology by economic branch    28 
4-4  Intramuros R&D expenditures in biotechnology by target        28 
4-5  Funds  invested  1999-2001         30 
4-6  European patents granted or genetic engineering equivalents      33 
4-7  Swiss patent requests to the European  Patent  Office    33 
4-8  National shares of the total number of publications in the biotechnology and 
applied  microbiology  NSIOD  journal  category      34 
4-9  Relative impact by country of publications in the biotechnology and applied 
microbiology  NSIOD  journal  category       34 
4-10  Public funding of research and development            35 
 





3-1  NCCR  financing          15 
3-2  Life  sciences  NCCR  at  a  glance        16 
3-3  Distribution of public funds in the period from 2004 to 2007      17 
3-4  Project based federal R&D funding by CTI           22 
3-5  CTI  budget  2000-2003         22 
3-6  CTI  budget  /  Message  2004-2007        24 
 
4-1  Number of companies in different  fields  of  activity      27 
 








This study proposes to analyse in an exploratory way the state of innovation and production 
systems in Swiss biotechnology and especially its innovative capacity and related factors. As 
biotechnology as such cannot be considered as an industrial sector but rather as a set of 
technologies developed in the field of life sciences, the direct link with science makes 
innovative capacity a major determinant of competitiveness. 
 
While large multinationals, such as biopharmaceuticals, may not need local technology 
suppliers, the presence of a local industry of research-based firms and technology suppliers is 
critical, because the industry is, by itself, a major source of growth and social progress. As in 
many other technologies, innovation in biotechnology was initially undertaken not by 
incumbents but by new companies. These companies were mainly university spin-offs and 
were usually created through collaboration between scientists and managers, backed by 
venture capital (VC). The purpose of this collaboration has been to mobilise fundamental 
knowledge created in universities and to transform it into commercially useful techniques and 
products. 
 
By observing how research and development (R&D) activities are organised in the field of 
biotechnology, we try to identify the relations existing between universities and the 
biotechnology industry, but also the relations between biotechnology firms among themselves. 
Hence we join the approach to strategic alliances, where it is argued that the constitution of 
coalitions and networks represents a key competitive advantage. 
 
We will subsequently explore the “cluster” approach. In fact, data show that a process of 
clustering is taking place in Europe where a small number of local clusters are capturing a 
dominant majority of biotechnology firms and of public research organisations. 
 
Furthermore, we will examine the role of the state and local governments in creating a 
favourable innovation climate. We will ask for example if the Swiss Priority Programme 
Biotechnology (SPP Biotechnology) has contributed to strengthen the relations between 
universities and industry, and if yes, in what terms. 
 
Therefore, in chapter I and II, we will give an introduction to the economic approaches we 
refer to in our study, i.e. strategic alliances and clustering in biotechnology. The aim is to 
reveal the importance of the networks inherent in these clusters for all actors involved in the 
process of technological innovation. 
 
Then, after presenting the Swiss science and technology (S&T) policy in chapter III, we will 
analyse institutional factors affecting Switzerland’s industrial competitiveness in 
biotechnology, e.g. the structure of its research system, the access to capital sources, the 
regulation of intellectual property rights (IPR) in biotechnology, and other institutional factors 
like public perceptions and the overall regulatory stance (chapter IV). Additionally, the 
review of the data available in the field of Swiss biotechnology activities aims to situate 
Switzerland’s position in the global market. 
 
Chapter V consists of a number of interviews with researchers from Swiss universities, chief 
researchers from companies specialised in biotechnology, and persons in charge in federal   2
institutions. This stage which constitutes the heart of our study will give us information about 
how persons and ideas circulate in the field of biotechnology, thus identifying the existence or 
non-existence of knowledge networks. Moreover, we will obtain information about the 
different institutional factors influencing the competitiveness of Swiss biotechnology. 
 
To conclude, a synthesis of the results found through the numerous interviews conducted with 
key actors of the Swiss biotech scene is given in chapter VI. Hence, we will obtain a general 
picture of biotechnology in Switzerland allowing us to better appreciate its situation. 
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   3
I Strategic  Alliances 
 
 
All major players involved in the creation, diffusion, and commercialization of R&D 
activities have experienced transformations in how innovation activities are financed, 
organized, and performed (Jankowski, 2001). General risks of conducting scientific research 
and commercializing its results have been compounded by the increased speed and 
multidisciplinary nature of technological developments. In such an environment, strategic 
alliances between firms have become an important tool for achieving sustainable competitive 
advantage allowing partners to share R&D costs, pool risks, and benefit from access to firm-
specific know-how and commercialization resources (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Vonortas, 
1997). Furthermore, changes in policy and market trends in all advanced economies, 
contributing to a national and global economy increasingly dependent on knowledge-based 
competition and networking, have fostered a new setting for collaborative research since the 
early 1980s. Indeed, the past two decades have shown an extraordinary increase in alliances. 
In 2000 alone, 574 new technology or research alliances were formed in six major sectors: 
information technology (IT), biotechnology, advanced materials, aerospace and defense, 
automotive, and (non-biotech) chemicals, according to the data available from MERIT-CATI
1 
(Hagedoorn, 2001). (See figure 1-1 and 1-2.) 
 
Figure 1-1:  Figure 1-2: 
























































Source: National Science Board (2002).  Source: National Science Board (2002).   
 
 
1.1  Definition and theory 
 
What is meant exactly when speaking about “strategic alliances”? Gulati (1998) defines them 
as:  
 
                                                 
1  The CATI (Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators) database is compiled by the Maastricht 
Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT) in the Netherlands. The data consist of 
interfirm cooperative arrangements, where the counts are restricted to strategic technology alliances, such as 
joint ventures for which R&D or technology sharing is a major objective, and other research corporations. To 
note that CATI is a literature-based database with newspapers, journal articles and books as its key sources.   4
“…voluntary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of 
products, technologies, or services. They can occur as a result of a wide range of motives and 
goals, take a variety of firms, and occur across vertical and horizontal boundaries.” (Gulati, 
1998, p. 293) 
 
Moreover, following Singh (2002), there are two general types of alliances, that is equity-
based and non-equity-based. Equity-based alliances include minority stock investments, joint 
ventures and at the extreme end, majority investments. Non-equity-based alliances tend to be 
governed mainly by a contractual arrangement that specifies the responsibilities of each party, 
the mode of operation of the alliance, and considerations involved in expansion or termination. 
 
Organizational scholars have studied the basis for hierarchical controls within organizations 
and saw them as a mechanism to manage uncertainty (Gulati and Singh, 1998, p. 781 ff). 
Earlier research on contract choices in alliances and the degree of hierarchical controls they 
embody has been influenced principally by transaction cost economists, who have focused on 
the appropriation concerns in alliances, which originate from pervasive behavioural 
uncertainty and contracting problems (for example, Pisano, Russo, and Teece, 1988; Pisano, 
1989; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993).
2  In this perspective, researchers have proposed that 
hierarchical controls are an effective response to such concerns at the time an alliance is 
formed. As a result, the greater the appropriation concerns, the more hierarchical the 
governance structures to be expected for organizing the alliance (Gulati and Singh, 1998, p. 
782). 
 
While appropriation concerns originating from contracting obstacles constitute an important 
concern, once firms decide to enter an alliance, there is another set of concerns that arises 
from anticipated coordination costs (Gulati and Singh, 1998, p. 782). These costs refer to the 
anticipated organizational complexity of decomposing tasks among partners along with 
ongoing coordination of activities to be completed jointly or individually across 




One important question – if not the most important question when conducting research on 
alliances – we did not answer until now is why firms enter strategic alliances? Considering all 
the costs of establishing an alliance, together with a high degree of failure of alliances as 
shown by many empirical studies (infra), there must be however enough reasons in favor of 
entering some new form of collaboration. From an extensive review of the alliance literature, 
Gulati and Singh (1998) were able to identify eight rationales of all the value creation logics 
of the partners engaging in an alliance (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1993), i.e.: 
 
1)  sharing costs (and risks); 
2)  access to financial resources; 
3)  sharing complementary technology; 
4)  reducing the time span of innovation; 
                                                 
2 The transaction cost approach to the theory of the firm was created by Ronald Coase (1937, 1960). It refers to 
the cost of providing for some good or service through the market rather than having it provided from within the 
firm. To summarize, transaction costs are costs of search and information, bargaining and decision, and policing 
and enforcement. 
3 To note that this concept is different from transaction cost economists’ coordination costs, which refer to the 
agency costs caused by the growth of organizations, which provide “decreasing returns to the entrepreneur 
function” (Coase, 1937, p. 340).   5
5)  joint development of new technology; 
6)  access to new markets; 
7)  access to new products, and 
8)  sharing production facilities. 
 
Hamdouch (2002) proposes a formalization of the coalitions’ building processes among firms, 
illustrated through two industry cases (airlines and biopharmaceuticals). Accordingly, given 
the scarcity of strategic partners within and across interrelated industries, the attraction of the 
partners presenting the most “strategic bilateral or multilateral value” follows a “pre-emptive 
process” which responds to the logic of the “first-mover’s advantage” (Hamdouch, 2002, p. 2). 
This partners’ pre-emption then relies on the phenomenon of “Increasing Returns to 
Coalition” (IRC) superposing on the other sources of increasing returns. 
 
 
1.2  Critiques of prior research on alliances
4 
 
Three related themes run across prior efforts analyzing the behavior of firms in alliances and 
the performance consequences from such collaborations. First, the unit of analysis usually 
adopted is the firm or the alliance, that means researchers have tried to identify the attributes 
of firms that influence their tendency to enter alliances or to identify the characteristics of 
these alliances. 
 
Second, researchers have been examining the formation and performance of alliances in an 
“asocial context” (Gulati, 1998, p. 294 ). The criticism here expressed by Gulati is that the 
external environment is normally summarized within measures of competitiveness in product 
or supplier markets. From a transaction costs point of view (supra), this means that the lower 
the competition, the more likely that a firm will be exposed to ‘small numbers bargaining’ and 
other forms of opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Finally, previous research on alliances has focused mainly on firm- and industry-level factors 
that drive firms to enter alliances. Scholars have particularly focused on the existing 
competence (or lack thereof) that may push firms to enter into new collaborations, but it 
seems that they have paid less attention to factors that may lead to the availability of and 
access to alliance opportunities. 
 
Furthermore, the focus on the firm or alliance as the unit of analysis and the description of 
external context in competitive terms does not take into account the actions of other firms or 
the relationships in which they themselves are already embedded. It ignores also the 
interactive elements of the market, whereby actors discover market information through their 
interactions in the market (Hayek, 1949; White, 1981). In fact, as demonstrated by 
sociologists, the distinct social structural patterns in exchange relations within markets shape 
the flow of information which in turn presents both opportunities and constraints for firms 
(White, 1981; Burt, 1982; Baker, 1984). Hence, much of the research on strategic alliances is 
characterized by an “undersocialized account of firm behavior” (Gulati, 1998, p. 295) as it 
neglects the influence of the social context in which firms are “embedded” (Gulati, idem) on 
their behavior and performance. This social context includes a whole range of elements that 
                                                 
4 This part is based on Gulati (1998, pp. 294-295).   6





1.3  Research partnerships 
 
It is possible to classify and analyze collaborations according to different criteria. By type of 
members, one can find a range of business, university, and government combinations. 
Concerning the activities, business alliances can concentrate on manufacturing, services, 
marketing, or technology-based objectives. This technology-based collaboration consists of 
joint research activities, technology co-development, contract research, and technology 
exchange, e.g. licensing and cross-licensing (National Science Board, 2002, p. 4-33). A subset 
of these wide interactions are strategic research partnerships (SRPs). They focus on joint 
R&D activities in contrast to contract research or other exclusively financing or exchange 
transactions. To mention that SRPs can take the form of formal joint ventures or more 
informal agreements. 
 
While in the early 1970s the majority of research partnerships were equity-based research 
corporations, more than 85 percent of research partnerships did not involve equity 
investments by the mid-1990s (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). In fact, this is attributed mainly to a 
higher degree of organizational flexibility of non-equity agreements. Nevertheless, it seems 
that SRPs of any type represent a flexible tool for pursuing upcoming technologies. Moreover, 
these partnerships can evolve into other types of agreements or acquisitions, or they might 
serve as an entry into new geographic markets over time.  
 
Gulati and Singh (1998, pp. 792-793) present a typology of alliance structure that defines 
three distinct types of alliance governance structures, i.e. joint ventures, minority investment, 
and contractual alliances, including their specific levels and forms of hierarchical controls. 
This typology shall allow then to understand the choice among alternative governance 
structures. 
 
Joint ventures occur when partners create a separate entity in which each owns a portion of 
the equity. In such alliances, a separate administrative hierarchy of managers provides an 
independent command structure and authority system with well defined rules and 
responsibilities for each partner. Hence, such an autonomous unit might enable the creation of 
an incentive system, because each partner is concerned about the value of its equity in the 
joint venture. 
 
In the case of minority alliances, firms work together without creating a new entity. One 
partner or a set of partners takes a minority equity position in the other (or others). The form 
of control appears to be weaker, with a degree of hierarchical control to be situated between 
that in joint ventures and that in contractual alliances (Herriott, 1996). In general, hierarchical 
supervision is created by the investing partner joining the board of directors of the partner that 
received the investment. In this type of alliance, a concern for the value of its equity should 
provide appropriate incentives for an investor. 
 
Contractual alliances do not involve the sharing or exchange of equity, and they do not lead to 
the creation of new organizational entities. They include unidirectional agreements such as 
                                                 
5 For a further discussion on the social context and the implications of social embeddedness on firm behavior and 
performance, see Gulati (1998, pp. 295 ff).   7
licensing, second-sourcing, and distribution agreements and bi-directional agreements such as 
joint contracts and technology exchange agreements. While elements of hierarchical control 




1.4  Alliance failures 
 
While the rate of alliance formation continues to be high, studies have indicated that over 
50% of alliances and partnering agreements in biotechnology and life sciences are not 
considered to be successful (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002). Respondents in a survey 
organized by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) were asked to identify the reasons contributing 
to past failures of alliances. Referring to the summary of this study, 40% of respondents cited 
the failure or slow speed at which results materialized from the alliance as a main reason for 
the demise of the alliance. This reason was followed by differences in partner cultures, cited 
by 34% of all respondents, in front of changes in senior management, cited by 28% as a 
reason for failure. (See figure 1-3.) To note that the size of a company can influence the 
frequency at which a factor is cited. Accordingly, poor communication among partners was 
cited by 36% respondents from large companies (more than 300 employees) in contrast to 
24% of respondents from smaller companies (less than 300 companies). 
 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), failing to achieve expected results, while the 
most commonly cited reason for failure, merely represents an outcome of other underlying 
drivers of failure. Moreover, it seems that some of these drivers, e.g. failure in technology, 
merger or acquisition changed priorities, and drastic changes in the business environment, 
have to be considered as being outside the control of management in charge of establishing 
and executing the alliance and therefore being uncontrollable. Thus, most of the drivers are 
supposed to be within management’s control, leaving significant potential to reduce failure 
rates of alliances. 
 
Figure 1-3: 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000). 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Respondents Mentioning
Expected results slow/fail to materialize
Differences in partner cultures
Changes in senior management
Weak commitment to alliance
Poor alliance leadership
Poor communication among partners
Failure in technology; failure in clinical trial
Merger or acquisition changed priorities of one of the partners
Drastic changes in the business environment
Alliance failures  8
II Innovative  Clusters 
 
 
Innovation through the creation, diffusion and use of knowledge presents a key driver of 
economic growth. At the same time, the increasingly complex interactions of our globalized 
knowledge-based economy at the local, national and world levels among individuals, firms 
and other knowledge institutions influence in a more and more significant way the innovation 
performance. Thus, there is significant body of evidence, economic analysis and previous 




2.1  Definition and concept 
 
Following Porter (1990), clusters are defined as “geographic concentrations of interconnected 
companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated 
institutions (for example, universities, standards agencies, and trade associations) in particular 
fields that compete but also co-operate”. Silicon Valley in the United States is probably the 
best known example of a cluster, but many other examples in different regions around the 
world and various sectors exist (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). 
 
Why do companies and other actors involved in the process of innovation, despite the trend 
towards globalization, prefer to “cluster”? Referring to the results of previous studies (supra), 
summarized to some extent in a report on biotechnology clusters published by the British 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 1999, pp. 9-11), companies benefit from sharing 
knowledge and reduce costs by jointly sourcing services and suppliers. Frequent interactions 
facilitate formal and informal knowledge transfer and encourage collaboration between 
complementary institutions. Local training institutions and a sound infrastructure can provide 
further benefits for companies. Moreover, rivalry between firms can stimulate 
competitiveness. To note also that life quality and other non economic factors can be just as 
important in determining growth. Finally, a critical mass effect will normally attract further 




On the other hand, the role of governments in the creation of clusters appears to be less clear 
and easy to define. In fact, there seems to be a general understanding (e.g., DTI, 1999, p. 10; 
Cooke and Morgan, 1998, p. 189) that clusters are business driven and that they form due to a 
variety of reasons, like the prior existence of related industries or institutions. Hence, “clusters 
often emerge and begin to grow naturally” (Porter, 1990, p. 655). Nevertheless, governments 
are able to create the necessary conditions which encourage the formation and growth of 
clusters. Following the view expressed by the British DTI (1999), government support for 
clusters cannot constitute a complete industrial policy, but should rather be part of a wider set 
of policies that include national and non-sectoral policies and programs that support 
innovation and competitiveness. Referring to Porter (1990), government at all levels can 
effectively play a role in reinforcing emerging clusters, i.e. through investments to create 
                                                 
6 See in particular: Porter (1990); Krugman (1991); Cooke and Morgan (1998); Swan et al. (1998); Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables (2001). 
7 In looking for reasons why firms locate in clusters, Prevezer (1997, p. 258-260) highlights benefits and costs of 
industrial clusters. Concerning benefits, one can distinguish between benefits on both the supply side, in making 
the supply of particular products easier, and on the demand side, through access to customer specification and to 
markets.   9




2.2   Theoretical approaches 
 
The OECD has published two major contributions about innovative clusters, i.e. “Boosting 
Innovation: The Cluster Approach” (OECD, 1999) and “Innovative Clusters: Drivers of 
National Innovation Systems” (OECD, 2001). While the former reported the available 
thinking in research and policy by a small number of analysts who wished to explore the topic 
in an internationally comparative context, the latter volume places more emphasis on the 
innovation theme connected to the examination of clusters. As improvements in methods, 
conceptualizations and empirical analyses are part of this volume, the following synthesis of 
clusters will be mainly based on it. 
 
Referring to the work of the OECD cluster focus group presented in OECD (2001), the cluster 
approach can be seen as a part of the concepts of the national innovation system (NIS) 
approach (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988 and 1992; Nelson, 1993, and Edquist, 1997).
8 
Moreover, the inherent logic that innovations could result directly from ongoing interactions 
among scientific, commercial, educational and public institutions – thus departing clearly 
from earlier linear concepts of innovation – was extended by offering a novel hypothesis that 
an industrial cluster could be thought of a reduced-NIS (OECD, 2001, p. 8). In fact, it is 
assumed that a national economy consists of several reduced-form innovation systems, 
represented by various distinct industrial clusters. It is to note that the final aim of this 
simplification is to allow a greater focus on the actions and policies that can stimulate 
processes of innovation. 
 
Seen as a part of innovation systems approaches, clusters are supposed to reflect the systemic 
character of modern innovation and interactive innovation processes, with innovation 
increasingly depending on interactions among interdependent actors, e.g. firms and other 
types of organizations. These interactions “among actors in the value chain” (OECD, 1999, p. 
13) are based on trade linkages, innovation linkages, knowledge flows or the sharing of a 
common knowledge base or factor conditions.
9 The concept advanced here is about “value 
chain clusters” which are considered as key sources of innovation (OECD, 2001, p. 8 ff), and 
used to define members of a cluster. Moreover, value chain methods shall contribute to clarify 




It is to note that questions about the relevance of value chain institutions will depend on the 
cluster under study. In fact, as each cluster has its specific value chain length and relative 
maturity, conclusions will differ. Short value chains, such as those in biotechnology, have less 
cumulative opportunities for the introduction of product or process innovations of the kind 
                                                 
8 For a short presentation of the concept of national innovation systems, see Zarin-Nejadan et al. (2002, pp. 3-6). 
9 Referring to Porter (1990), the activities performed in competing in a particular industry can be grouped into 
different categories that constitute, when taken together, the “value chain”. These activities can be divided into 
those involved in the ongoing production, e.g. marketing, delivery, and servicing of the product (primary 
activities) and those providing purchased inputs, technology, human resources, or overall infrastructure functions 
to support the other activities (support activities). See Porter (1990, p. 40 ff). 
10 Referring to recent studies of innovation, firms that trade with each other along the value chain as suppliers or 
customers can be considered as the most significant elements of this chain responsible for innovation (Bergman 
and Feser, 2001; Cooke, Boekholt and Toedtling, 2000).   10
that occur along the lengthier value chains of intermediate suppliers as it is the case for the 
ICT cluster. The reason for this is that short value chains rely almost completely on 
laboratory-based knowledge and innovations, therefore also influencing the kind of 
knowledge (implicit or explicit) which is produced (OECD, 2001, p. 10).
11 
 
Further questions revealed by the OECD cluster focus group (2001, p. 11) concern labor 
mobility, the firms’ absorptive capacity of available innovations, and innovative networks. 
Indeed, related transfers of human capital and in particular implicit (tacit) knowledge might 
occur within the same industrial cluster, but can be also applied in many different sectors or 
clusters, hence “propagating innovations across clusters”. Second, as clusters and alliances 
can be considered as a possible platform for developing competency mixes, the capacity of 
individual firms to absorb and embed new technologies becomes a key asset. Finally, as 
innovative networks (i.e. clusters that are not purely based on value chains) cut across 
different value chain clusters, they include sectors that share similar technologies but produce 
different goods and services in more than one value chain. Consequently, innovations created 




2.3  Lessons from innovative clusters 
 
Besides being an analytical instrument, the cluster approach offers a framework for 
addressing or removing systemic imperfections in the functioning of an industrial cluster or 
reduced-NIS. In practice, the cluster approach can be a useful framework for developing and 
applying new forms of governance, not based on direct intervention but indirect inducement. 
Furthermore, the approach focuses upon assisting networks and creating the institutional 
setting that provides incentives for market-induced cluster formation but also for the 
revitalization of already existing clusters. Finally, it can be also seen as a tool for knowledge 
and innovation management in the case of policy makers. However, there is neither a standard 
cluster approach, nor a fixed policy recipe for implementing the cluster approach in practice 
(OECD, 2001, p. 405 ff). 
 
Cluster analyses reveal that every country or region has a unique selection of clusters and 
specializations with different characteristics and role in economy. History, the types of 
knowledge, the particular stage in the cluster’s life cycle and networking practices are among 
those factors responsible for cluster specificity and for differences between clusters. The 
cluster approach allows a better understanding of the structure and specialization of individual 
economies, including the role that different clusters play in the wider economy. The 
examination of different clusters reveals also the heterogeneity of the economic activities, in 
terms of size, connectedness, R&D intensity, share of innovative products, etc. As individual 
clusters are likely to differ on many aspects, cluster specificity implies the need for 
customized sets of policies to promote innovation in clusters. 
 
It has to be outlined that clusters of which all individual elements are to be found in a 
confined area are rather the exception. In fact, it might even be counterintuitive to expect 
“complete” clusters (OECD, 2001, p. 408) at the regional or national level as the relevant 
knowledge base is extremely internationalized.  Another important aspect here is the scale of 
individual countries. It seems that in relatively large economies like the United Kingdom 
                                                 
11 For a distinction between “implicit” and “explicit” knowledge, see Mack (2003).   11
(Charles and Benneworth, 2001), cluster-based innovation systems are likely to emerge at a 
regional scale. These regional innovation systems then contain a particular set of 
characteristics that differentiate them from scaled-down national innovation systems. As they 
draw heavily on national inputs that may lie outside the region, such clusters cannot be 
restricted to a specific region, but are often trans-regional.
12 
 
Emerging, technology-based clusters, such as in the ICT or biotechnology sector, seem to be 
international in character from the outset. Hence, these clusters can be described as mixed 
local and global phenomena, also called the “global-local paradox” by Larosse et al. (2001). 
In fact, most countries are not able to replicate complete value chains within their national 
borders, which is even more obvious for the smaller, open economies. The consequence of 
this is that these clusters normally specialize in certain segments. More mature clusters (e.g. 
agro-food, construction) on the other hand are expected to function mainly at a national or 
regional level. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all parts of the value chain have to be 
present at those levels. By the way, admitting that innovation in so-called low-tech clusters is 
knowledge-based as well, requires nonetheless an open mind towards the role that non-
technological knowledge (e.g. organizational and market knowledge) but also cultural 
phenomena play in innovation. Therefore, just looking at R&D intensities is probably not 
enough when facilitating innovation. 
 
Cluster innovation policies (OECD, 2001, p. 411 ff) are about creating the necessary 
framework conditions for facilitating innovation. They should identify barriers to innovation 
and build relationships and networks, thus needing an appropriate mix of analysis and action. 
How this is realized will differ across clusters and countries, but important variables are the 
way in which dialogue among industry, research and governments is institutionalized, the size 
of the economy, the policy culture, the level of government intervention and the degree of 
industrial and technological specialization. The cluster approach does not only provide an 
assistance in identifying networks and linkages between industries (Romanainen, 2001), but 
also a working tool for policy makers to create in advance platforms and programs for cross-
disciplinary and/or cross-industry interaction. 
 
As shown by the different case studies presented in OECD (2001), policies influence the way 
how clusters emerge and the way how their innovative capacities develop over time. 
Nevertheless, not all policy initiatives and regulations affecting innovation in clusters were 
originally initiated to support innovation. In fact, clusters and innovation in clusters can be 
equally influenced by other types of policy making as by explicit cluster policies. On the other 
hand, this also implies that some policies might have a negative effect on the emergence or 
further development of clusters.
13 For example, as cluster innovation policies generally start 
from analyzing the systemic imperfections in clusters, it might well be the case that some 
forms of policy making are counterproductive from an innovation point of view. In 
conclusion, it is important to look at a wider array of policies and their interactions in policy 
systems. Cluster policies are not a separate type of policy but also include other policy fields 
and therefore call for interdepartmental co-ordination. 
 
                                                 
12 Indeed, regional or national economies cannot be automatically defined as regional or national innovation 
systems if the only qualifying criteria is a geographical boundary. Some regions might have attributes which 
foster the development of clusters but not every region functions automatically as an innovation system. 
13 One example is the biotechnology sector. Regulatory restriction on new applications of genetic technologies, 
due for example to societal disagreement and a fear of the unintended consequences of innovation, can have 
negative effects on the cluster emergence or development.   12
However, the cluster approach does not offer standard policy recipes to increase the 
innovativeness of a particular cluster. Its translation into practical policy tools is extremely 
cluster-specific as different innovation dynamics require different actions. The principal task 
of policy makers promoting innovation in clusters is to facilitate the networking process and 
create an institutional setting which provides incentives for market-induced cluster formation 
and forms of co-operation.
14  Examples of innovation policy measures include: raising 
awareness of the benefits of knowledge exchange and networking; initiating network brokers 
and intermediaries to bring actors together; facilitating the informal and formal exchange of 
knowledge; setting up programs and projects for collaborative R&D; and ensuring links 
between universities and industry. At the same time, non-innovation policies might also be 
used to stimulate innovation, such as competition policies, education policies, fiscal policies, 
environmental policies, and regional policies. 
 
The choice of using which instrument and analytical tool, and when, depends not only on the 
particularities of a certain cluster, but also on the stage in the cluster’s life cycle. Moreover, 
there might be a danger of favoring already existing clusters, and to give less attention to the 
identification and facilitation of emerging innovative clusters. Another risk in cluster analyses 
and cluster policies lies in the risk of focusing only on high-tech or vanguard clusters (e.g. 
ICT or biotechnology), thus neglecting low- or medium-tech clusters. However, these clusters 
might be a combination of a unique mix of strongly localized factor conditions and 
development trajectories built up over a long time.
15 But this means also that the creation of a 
knowledge-based economy should not be equated with an exclusive focus on high technology, 
but rather building on existing strengths. As a consequence, working with standard policy 
models and using a “one-size-suits-all” approach (OECD, 2001, p. 415) can be 
counterproductive. 
 
To conclude, one can say that using and making operational the cluster approach is a process 
of experimentation, variation, customization and codification (OECD, 2001, p. 416). 
Furthermore, cluster-based policy making shows up to be a multidimensional issue combining 
theory and practice. It is a balancing act between bottom-up and top-down initiatives; between 
supporting established mature clusters and newly emerging clusters; and between 
international, national and regional levels of policy making, thus considering, if necessary, 
cross-border co-operation for cross-border clusters. Finally, the general need to increase 












                                                 
14 Balancing competition and supporting co-operation is probably one of the major difficulties while facilitating 
innovation in clusters. 
15 Krugman (1991) underlines that whereas much attention has been focused recently on high technology clusters, 
concentration and localization of industries has been typical of many not particular highly technological 
industries.   13





The Confederation's responsibilities in the field of S&T are exercised through two federal 
ministries: the Federal Department of Home Affairs and the Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs, governmental entities that are part of the Federal Council. (See figure 3-
1.) This dual authority indicates the extent to which the two federal departments share a 
common interest in active involvement in S&T policy. On the one hand, the Federal 
Department of Home Affairs safeguards national interests pertaining to the development of 
the science and technology base, and on the other hand, the Federal Department of Economic 
Affairs promotes the economic aspects and interests of vocational education and the 
promotion of economic activity in the S&T sector. The competences of the two offices differ 
but their respective missions complement each other and converge in the pursuit of a coherent 
and effective national S&T policy. 
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The Swiss Science and Technology Council (SSTC) is the advisory body of the Federal 
Council for all matters relating to science, training, research and technology policy. Formerly 
known as the Swiss Science Council, the agency underwent restructuring in 1999
16, as part of 
a package of reforms aimed at streamlining governmental institutions active in research and 
S&T in view of a more efficient, simplified and transparent operation of the relevant 
authorities. The SSTC undertakes technology assessments and identifies the information 
required for policy-making to the attention of the Federal Council, and suggests measures for 
their implementation. It is an independent panel that is now exclusively composed of 
scientists.  
 
The SSTC recently submitted a nine-point program to the Federal Council, the government's 
executive branch, outlining its vision of a productive science and technology policy, and 
proposing solutions to the problems that presently keep Swiss innovation and research trapped 
in a state of mediocrity. The recommendations include unifying Switzerland's fragmented 
higher education system, installing a modern tenure-track system, shoring up support for 
long-term basic research, and increasing the science and technology budget by 10% a year 
from 2004 to 2007
17.  
 
Also mandated by the Federal Government, the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), 
mostly financed by the Confederation, supports research undertaken inside and outside 
universities, and promotes young scientific talent through the awarding of research grants and 
fellowships. 
 
The Swiss Science Agency (SSA) was created in 1990 with the purpose of improving the 
coordination and coherence of policy in the fields of science, research, and higher education, 
and helping intensify contacts between universities and industry, both on the national and 
international levels. It is headed by the State Secretary of Science and has the task of 
implementing the strategies developed by the Federal Department of Home Affairs for higher 
education and S&T, and it coordinates these strategies with the other federal offices, the 
cantons and private industry. Subjugated to the SSA, are the Federal Office for Education 
and Science (FOES) and the Board of the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology (BFIT). 
The FOES  is responsible for preparing and implementing laws on education, science and 
research. Also, in the field of higher education, it subsidizes the cantonal universities. The 
BFIT is the highest authority for the two Federal Institutes of Technology (ETH Zurich and 
EPF Lausanne) and the four federal affiliated research institutes
18. It defines the basic 
objectives of these institutes and allocates resources accordingly. Operational management is 
delegated to the institutions.  
 
The Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology
19 (FOPET) was established 
in 1998 following a new mandate by the Federal Department of Home Affairs in the 
framework of the restructuring process. The FOPET is responsible for training policy at the 
Universities of Applied Sciences (HES)
20 and the integration of the HES into a "Swiss higher 
education system". The FOPET is also in charge of creating direct links between applied 
                                                 
16 Following the November 15, 1998 message from the Federal Council to Parliament on education, research and 
development. 
17 For full report, see http://www.swtr.ch/swtr_en/pdf/Neunpunkte/9PointProgr_eng.pdf. 
18 Paul Scherrer Institute; Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research; Federal Laboratory for 
Materials Testing and Research; Federal Institute for Environmental Science and Technology. 
19 Preceded by the Federal Institute of Industry, Arts&Crafts, and Labor. 
20 Hautes Écoles Spécialisés in French, or Fachhochschulen in German.   15
research and its industrial exploitation, a task it exercises through an attached office, the 
Commission for Technology and Innovation
21 (CTI). 
 
In 1992, the SNSF launched a new research policy instrument named Swiss Priority 
Programs (SPP). The objective of the SPP was to concentrate national research capacities in 
areas of strategic importance in order to promote inter-institutional research and closer 
cooperation between academia and industry. The programs lasted for 8 to 10 years and were 
given funds between CHF 60 and 110 million. Since 1992, eight priority programs were 
launched. The programs "Environment", "Biotechnology"
22 , "Information and 
Communication Structures", and "Switzerland: Towards the Future" were managed by the 
SNSF. The BFIT assumed responsibility for the programs "Optics", "Materials", and 
"Microsystems and Nanosystems", all of which terminated in 1999, as scheduled. In a report 
entitled "The Future of Priority Programs of the Confederation after 1999"
23, the SNSF 
concludes that "the highlights and accomplishments of the SPP show that this instrument of 
encouragement has, in general, lived up to the expectations expressed at the time of its 
introduction in 1992." However, though the SPP have contributed to  the creation of ties 
between industry and academia and interdisciplinary research, the long-term sustainability of 
a coordinated network of centres of competence in the university and research domains has 
proven to be improbable. It is for this reason that, at the recommendation of the SNSF, the 
SSP were gradually phased out, and evolved towards a new concept, the National Centres of 
Competence in Research (NCCR). 
 
The SNSF took the initiative of introducing the NCCR in November 1998. The primary goal 
was to create a new instrument of research promotion in order to strengthen interdisciplinary 
research and the application of research results to strategically important fields of research. 
The ambitious program, which is coordinated by the SNSF, saw the creation in the year 2001 
of 14 NCCR, in 8 pilot institutions around the country, and is expected to run over a period of 
8 to maximum12 years, with refinancing planned after four and eight years. In its end stage 
the program could include up to 25 NCCR. 
 
Federal funding for the NCCR is voted by Parliament, and completed by funding from the 
institutions themselves, and from third parties. (See table 3-1.) As a rule of thumb, it appears 
that the SNSF contributes about half of the resources.  
 
Table 3-1: NCCR financing (first four years, CHF) 
 
Overall resources for the 14 NCCR  529 million 
SNSF funding (Federal funds)  224.8 million 
Self-funding by home institutions  84.69 million 
Self-funding by project participants 174.69  million 
Third-party funding  44.82 million 
Source: SNSF "National Centres of Competence in Research" Edition 2001/2002. 
 
 
Significant resources were allocated to life sciences (see table 3-2 for the four NCCR active in 
life sciences research). The already well-established tradition and infrastructure of life-
                                                 
21 See section 3.3 for details. 
22 For an in-depth look at the SPP Biotechnology, see section 3.4. 
23 SNSF, 1998.   16
sciences research in the country, as well as its tremendous potential contribute to the generous 
funding attributed to its further development. Other areas of focus are telecommunications, 
micro- and nanotechnologies, material and environmental sciences. The aspiration of the 
SNSF to rejuvenate Switzerland's technology portfolio with the foundation of 14 new research 
centers is hoped to accelerate the anticipated reversal of the "brain drain" into a much-needed 
"brain gain", and to consequently fortify the country's position as a world leader in R&D.  
 
Table 3-2: Life sciences NCCR at a glance 
 
NCCR







Start  May 2001  July 2001  May 2001  June 2001 
Staff (full-time 
equivalent)  47 60-70  90-100 120 












project participants  2.3 mio  25.9 mio  9.5 mio  45.5 mio 
Third-party 
funding  5.5 mio  -  -  4 mio 
(Serono) 
ISREC: Swiss Institute for Experimental Cancer Research, Lausanne. 
Where applicable, figures are expressed in CHF. 
 





The newly published white paper
29 on education, research and technology for the period from 
2004 to 2007, entitled "Invest in Swiss science", contains the Swiss Government's proposals 
to Parliament for the next four-year financial period. The government proposes a 6% increase 
in spending during this period, but retains the option of reducing this rate as a contribution to 
stabilization of the national budget. However, the best-case scenario foresees total 
investments in education, research and technology amounting to CHF 17.3 billion. (See table 
3-3.) Should the national budget veer into the red in the next quadrennial, then the allocated 
budgets will be reduced by 1% in 2004, 1.5% in 2005 and 1% in 2006 and 2007. Considering 
this scenario, total expenditure for the 2004 to 2007 period would still reach CHF 16.8 billion. 
 
The white paper's proposals focus principally on financial issues. However, the government 
renews its call for all concerned parties to intensify the reform process begun in the 2000 to 
2003 quadrennial, in the next four-year period. The main thrust of the paper essentially does 
not differ significantly from the previous "Message":   
                                                 
24 For complete list of all 14 NCCR and further details: www.snf.ch. 
25 For further details: www.nccr-oncology.ch. 
26 For further details: www.unige.ch/frontiers-in-genetics. 
27 For further details: www.structuralbiology.unizh.ch. 
28 For further details: www.nccr-neuro.unizh.ch. 
29 November 2002.   17
Firstly, the higher institutes of education are to collaborate between one another more closely 
than before. The goal remains to create and consolidate networks of tertiary education
30, in an 
effort to better exploit the existing potential that lies within, and to harmonize study courses in 
line with the principles laid out in the Bologna Declaration. The ultimate vision of the 
government is increased modularisation of education and the removal of incompatibilities 
between institutions and the use of new teaching techniques. This revision lies mainly in the 
hands of the Swiss University Conference and must be attained through its own innovation 
and cooperation projects.  
 
Secondly, the SNSF (the country's prime instrument for the promotion of research) will be 
attributed a substantial increase in allocated funds, which will be used to benefit independent 
basic research. The government has laid out a plan outlining an action program on four levels. 
Finally, the CTI is to see a 52% increase in its budget. The extra funds are to strengthen the 
CTI's authority in evaluating innovative products and technologies. (See table 3-6, section 
3.3.) The government made additional proposals for bolstering innovation and technology 
transfer through intensified support for new enterprises in the start-up phase. The "CTI Start-
up" program is to be continued, and priority will be given to the promising future technologies 
(life sciences, nanotechnology, IT etc.). Furthermore, external communications will need to 
be drastically improved, as there is a need to heighten the awareness of science and 
technology among Swiss youth. Finally, "Discovery Projects" are to be promoted. These are 
projects with great market potential which carry high financial risks. The government also 
wishes to see a closer collaboration between the SNSF and the CTI. 
 
The government has sent its white paper to the members of both chambers for consideration. 
The parliamentary schedule provides for discussion of the white paper and the application for 
credit by the National Council in the spring session of 2003. The Council of States' 
opportunity to debate it comes in June 2003. During the fall session in 2003, the last in the 
legislative period, the two chambers can come to an agreement.
31 
 
Table 3-3: Distribution of public funds in the period from 2004 to 2007 
 
 Planning  period
2000 to 2003 
Planning period
2004 to 2007 
Increase 
ETH Domain (ETHZ, EPFL 
and 4 research institutions) 
6.9 billion  7.8 billion  865 million (12%)
Swiss National Science 
Foundation 
1.4 billion  2.1 billion  680 million (46%)
Commission for Technology 
and Innovation 
308 million  467 million  159 million (52%)
Universities of Applied 
Sciences 
854 million  1.1 billion  285 million (33%)
Professional Training  1.7 billion  2.1 billion  417 million (24%)
Cantonal universities  2.1 billion  2.6 billion  561 million (27%)
Source: Vision No. 1/2003. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Cantonal universities, Universities of Applied Sciences, Federal Institutes of Technology. 
31 Vision No. 1/2003.   18
3.2  Higher education system in Switzerland 
 
3.2.1  Federal government versus Cantonal government 
 
Switzerland's education system is amongst the most decentralized in the world. This is due 
not only to the well-known cultural and linguistic diversity of Switzerland but, equally 
important, results from the fact that policy-making in modern Switzerland is based on three 
fundamental principles: direct democracy, federalism, and subsidiarity. Subsidiarity in a 
compound political system with several levels of decision-making means that policies are 
always made at the lowest possible level, and that the higher level should only legislate when 
there is agreement that overall regulation is necessary. These three complementary political 
concepts, as practiced by the Swiss, are regarded as key factors to the country's democracy, 
stability and prosperity. The occasionally conflicting interpretation and application of 
subsidiarity in Swiss educational policy has led to extensive diversity in educational structures. 
Therefore, one cannot really talk of a single  Swiss educational system, but rather of a 
compound structure of cantonal, federal, and mixed bodies responsible for its coordination 
and management. (See figure 3-2.) 
 
Today, there are twelve "traditional" universities, plus seven regional Universities of Applied 
Sciences (HES or Fachhochschulen). In addition, there exist a large number of Advanced 
Vocational Colleges, offering a professional rather than an academic education in a wide 
range of subjects. In comparison with other OCDE countries, Switzerland thus distinguishes 
itself with a very high density of institutes of higher education
32.   
 
The Federal Government plays a dual role in the administration of education: Switzerland's 
federal constitution authorizes the Confederation on the one hand to subsidize the cantonal 
universities, and on the other to set up its very own institutions of higher education, in 
particular the two Federal Institutes of Technology. The Confederation, by virtue of being the 
sole representative of all cantons, also safeguards higher education on a national scale by 
promoting increased coordination among universities and the harmonization of programs. The 








Switzerland can claim over 500 years of academic continuity: the first Swiss university was 
founded in Basel in 1460. Over the centuries to follow, nine other universities were founded 
across Swiss territory. Of these "traditional" universities, there are 7 fully-fledged Cantonal 
universities
33, 2 small cantonal university-level institutions
34 and one university specializing 




                                                 
32 www.swiss-science.org, 2000. 
33  University of Berne, University of Basel, University of Fribourg, University of Lausanne, University of 
Geneva, University of Neuchâtel, University of Zurich. 
34 University College of Lucerne, Università della Svizzera italiana (founded in 1996). 
35 University of St. Gallen.   19
Figure 3-2: Structure of higher education 
 
 




























The Swiss University Conference (SUC) is an organization whose tasks are shared by the 
Confederation and the cantons, and which brings together two representatives of the 
Confederation, two representatives of each canton hosting a university, and two 
representatives from the non-university cantons. The SUC underwent a face-lift recently, 
when, in view of the broad reformations in education- research- and technology-policy
36 in 
1998, it was given decision-making powers that would allow it to play a much more active 
role than before. In effect, the SUC changed from being a mere coordinating agency to a 
governing body allowed to apply and enforce the policies defined in common by the 
Confederation and the cantons. The reforms came into force at the start of the 2000-2003 
quadrennial. The SUC is subject to the Federal Act of Financial Assistance to Universities
37, 
which gives it a wide range of competences that strive at coordinating and harmonizing 
national and cantonal interests in the domain of higher education, and empower the SUC to 
define and carry out Swiss university policy, encourage the development of higher institutes 
of education, and formulate recommendations and directives to the attention of the entities in 
charge of the higher institutes as well as the higher institutes themselves. The reformed SUC 
is testament to how the original concept of a completely decentralized university system in 
                                                 
36 These reforms were an initiative of the government, spearheaded by Secretary of State Charles Kleiber. 
37 Revised LAU 414.20 from 8.10.1999 according to the Plan for the 2000-2003 period, enacted 1.4.2000. 
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Switzerland has evolved towards a cohesive, centralized structure in which the 
Confederation's participation has significantly increased. 
  
Federal Institutes of Technology  
 
The Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology (FIT) in Lausanne (EPFL) and Zurich (ETHZ), 
founded in 1853 and 1854 respectively, together with the four affiliated federal research 
institutes, are institutions falling under the responsibility of the Swiss Confederation, 
dedicated to higher learning and research. More specifically, the FIT's objectives consist of 
training engineers and architects, stimulating basic and applied research, engaging in 
industrial and business collaboration and partnerships, and providing post-graduate and 
further education.  The four affiliated research centres' efforts are primarily concentrated on 
application-oriented research. 
 
The FIT uphold their autonomy and identity on the basis of the FIT Federal Law
38. This law 
stipulates that the EPFL and ETHZ are autonomous establishments that independently 
administer their affairs and are guaranteed the liberty of setting their own educational agenda, 
as well as their research programs and choice of curricula. Swiss Federal Law provides that 
"the autonomy of the FIT is subject to restrictions insofar as a long-term planning and the 
coordination of education and research require it."  
 
Universities of Applied Sciences (HES) 
 
In 1995, the Swiss federal parliament decided to restructure the vocational institutes that are 
supervised by the federal authorities (engineering, economics and management, and design). 
In order to make better use of its resources, the government created seven regional 
Universities of Applied Sciences
39. Reforms were carried out with the intention of upgrading 
the quality of HES curriculums and presenting an accreditation and diploma-awarding system 
worthy of a university-level institution. Today, the HES schools are comparable to those 
elsewhere in Europe, placing the system at international university level, and the curriculums 
taught and diplomas awarded by the HES are established so as to be Euro-compatible. Since 
their inception in 1995, the HES have been in a continuous process of development with the 
aim of harmonizing structures and profiles, and defining and providing a common level of 
professional education. The end of this development phase is slated for 2003.  
 
The status of the HES is dictated by the Federal Law on Universities of Applied Sciences
40, 
which states that the HES are institutes of education on the same level as the existing Swiss 
universities. The main characteristic is that it puts education for professional practice at its 
core.  
 
For the establishment and operation of the HES, CHF 540 million is allocated every year. The 
Cantons provide two thirds of this and the Federal Government one third. The coordinating 
body for the HES is the Swiss Council for the HES, which is in turn set up by the Swiss 
Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Education. The Federal Commission for the 
HES, on the other hand, decides on proposals to establish an HES as well as on requests for 
accreditation. The Federal Government ultimately approved the opening of the seven regional 
                                                 
38 "Loi Fédérale sur les écoles polytechniques fédérales 414.10", dating from 4.10.1991. 
39  HES Bern, HES Central Switzerland, HES Eastern Switzerland, HES Northwestern Switzerland, HES     
Southern Switzerland, HES Western Switzerland, HES Zurich. 
40 "Loi Fédérale sur les Hautes Ecoles Spécialisés (HES) 414.71", dating from 6.10.1995.   21
HES after a rigorous selection process. During the development phase, which will terminate 
in 2003, the government will enlist scientific experts to evaluate all degree programs over 
which it has control. Only those schools which satisfy its standards will receive the right to 
federally approved degrees.  
 
 
3.3     Governmental institutions and programs 
 
Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI) 
 
For over 50 years, albeit under different names, the CTI sponsors dynamic enterprises to 
transfer novel ideas into commercial products and services. After World War II, the federal 
government launched a series of economic policies
41 and subsidizing schemes with the aim of 
boosting the economy and creating jobs. The Federal Office for Economic Affairs and the 
subordinated predecessor
42 to the FOPET were responsible for the implementation of articles 
in federal law pertaining to issues related to R&D and patenting, leading to the creation of the 
Commission for the Encouragement of Scientific Research (CERS). The CERS became the 
CTI following the enactment of ruling 832.312 on the granting of subsidies for the 
encouragement of technology and innovation, in 1982.   
 
Since the year 2000, the CTI enjoys the official status of "federal agency for applied research 
and development". It remains in effect the key instrument of the Swiss federal government's 
technology policy. Subjugated to the Federal Department of Economic Affairs (see figure     
3-1), the CTI plays a significant role in Switzerland's economic policy, which distinguishes it 
clearly from other governmental agencies in the field of research policy. The principal raison 
d'être of the CTI, as defined by the Swiss Chambers of Parliament, is to promote innovation, 
technology and competitiveness particularly in favor of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), and thus to maintain and improve Switzerland's leading edge position in the global 
economy.  
 
CTI address the abovementioned challenges by proposing a comprehensive package of 
support services to SMEs eager to develop products based on their research findings, but often 
lacking the financial resources, manpower, infrastructure and access to relevant information to 
do so. To remedy these shortcomings and simultaneously better exploit the sub-optimal use of 
knowledge in the higher education sector, CTI encourages and supports cooperation of 
enterprises, research and higher educational institutions in joint R&D projects, and the 
efficient transfer of technology between them, hence, its credo "science to market". CTI aims 
to facilitate the access of SMEs to the federal institutes of technology, universities and HES, 
as well as European and international research programs. Through the rapid development and 
commercialization of innovative ideas, CTI thus also aspires to create new jobs in Switzerland 
and ensure the security of existing ones. CTI focuses its activities on the following fields: 
biotechnology and life sciences, nanotechnology and microsystems, and information and 
communication technology. 
 
The CTI counts some 25 members, including four permanent experts, whom are all prominent 
figures from industry and scientists with industrial backgrounds working for the CTI on an 
honorary basis. Together, they form a team in which matters are treated expeditiously yet with 
maximum efficiency and flexibility, and a minimum of bureaucracy. CTI policy is based on a 
                                                 
41 Loi fédérale sur les mesures préparatoires en vue de combattre les crises et de procurer du travail (823.31). 
42 Office Fédéral de l'industrie, des arts et métiers et du travail (OFIAMT).   22
"bottom-up" or grass-roots approach, meaning that collaborative R&D projects are not 
instigated by any government agency. Rather, projects are initiated by enterprises and/or in 
conjunction with R&D or higher educational institutions. Government subsidies are paid for 
the expenses of public R&D or higher educational institutions participating in the projects
43, 
and industry covers its own expenses, generally 50% of the total project costs. This 
investment ensures that CTI projects have a clear market focus, thus increasing the probability 
that projects yield results that will be effectively used.  
 
In 1999 the CTI spent over CHF 60 million on project-based R&D funding, nearly double the 
figure of 1996. (See table 3-4.) Between 1986 and 2000, the CTI has sponsored some 2700 
projects, providing funds exceeding CHF 680 million and paying CHF 600 million in salaries 
to early 10'000 project workers between 1986 and 1999. That SMEs benefit considerably 
from CTI's aid is illustrated by their increasing participation in the programs of CTI. Indeed, 
between 1996 and 1999, some 1900 enterprises benefited from CTI support, of which 90% 
were SMEs. And in that same period, more than 1000 projects received funding totaling CHF 
600 million, two thirds coming from private industry. 
 
Table 3-4: Project based federal R&D funding by CTI (in CHF millions) 
 
1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
36.1  35.4 36.5 32.5 32.6 40.4 57.3 61.7 
Source: CEST, SSTC. 
 
 
The CTI's budget stood at around CHF 80 million annually for the quadrennial 2000-2003. 
The breakdown of this budget can be seen in table 3-5. 
 
Table 3-5: CTI budget 2000-2003 (in CHF millions) 
 




CTI standard projects  120  30 
CTI-HES: competence building  80  20 
CTI Start-up  10  2.5 
MedTech 20  5 
Softnet 30  7.5 
Application-oriented education 
research  10 2.5 
Eureka 40  10 
Intelligent Manufacturing Systems 
(IMS)  10 2.5 
TOTAL 320  80 
Source: CEST, SSTC. 
                                                 
43 ETHZ, EPFL, cantonal universities, and HES included.   23
The support of standard projects is the core business of the CTI and thus consumes the major 
part of its budget, over one third. However, support is also given to theme-oriented projects 
with future potential, in the form of several programs such as SOFTNET
44 and MEDTECH
45. 
CTI-HES deals with the reform of the HES and the establishment of competence centers and 
applied R&D
46. CTI Start-up
47  encourages the foundation of enterprises in the high-tech 
sector.  
 
CTI Start-up was initiated in 1995 by the FOPET
48 as one of the activities for CTI. The 
principal idea was to boost the spirit of enterprise at the junction between universities and 
industry. Switzerland, in comparison with other industrialized countries and particularly with 
the US, is not known for bold entrepreneurship and taking risks. In fact, comparatively few 
new enterprises are founded that offer marketable products with a future. With this challenge 
in mind, CTI Start-up was established.  
 
CTI Start-up offers active support and expert advice from the idea to the finished, marketable 
product, and places particular focus on the especially difficult start-up phase of founding a 
company. The initiative selects and qualifies new enterprises for venture capital financing, 
and facilitates contacts with universities and industry in order to further the development of 
innovative and marketable technology. Financial and logistical support is granted mainly to 
projects in the field of so-called "markets of the future". These include software, information 
technology, microelectronics, biotechnology and medical technology, but assistance is also 
extended to other projects with high growth potential.  
 
Qualified projects are granted the "CTI Start-up label". This seal of approval gives the start-up 
company access to CTI support and venture capital. Label carriers also stimulate the interest 
of potential investors, simplifying their decision. After the successful completion of the 
setting up of a company, CTI start-up remains present and active by intermediary of its 
"business angels center". "Business angels", experienced Swiss businessmen who take a 
central role in the guidance of a start-up's first steps into the business world, offer knowledge 
and experience to young entrepreneurs and also share the financial risk of the project.    
 
It is important to underline the fundamental characteristic which differentiates the CTI from 
the non-governmental TLOs: while the underlying principle of TLOs is the valorization of 
research results through the effective transfer of technology from university to industry, CTI 
seeks first and foremost to boost the creation of jobs in the high-tech industry by promoting 
entrepreneurship and providing financial and logistical support in the realization of this goal. 
 
CTI Start-up's formula for encouraging the creation of new high-tech companies in 
traditionally risk-averse entrepreneurial Switzerland has proved successful. Since its inception, 
more than 300 applications have been evaluated, of which 78 have been presented to the 
Industrial Board. CTI Start-up has thus far contributed to the creation of over 450 jobs, 
generating an estimated turnover of over CHF 100 million. These trends are indicative of the 
increasing effectiveness of the CTI's initiative in terms of companies and jobs created. The 
                                                 
44 SOFTNET encourages the development, commercialization and application of software made in Switzerland. 
45 MEDTECH was launched with the intention of boosting knowledge transfer and networking in the field of 
medical technology. 
46 The CTI should become the main financing institution for research at the HES, just as the SNSF is now for the 
"traditional" universities. 
47 KTI Start-up is its original German name. 
48 "Bundesamt für Berufsbilding und Technologie" (BBT) is its original German appellation.   24
growing number of submitted projects to the industrial committee is an indication of the value 
of the CTI Start-up label in the eyes of the scientific and research community.  
 
The government's white paper on education, research and technology for the period from 
2004 to 2007, "Invest in Science", calls for the continued support of CTI and its activities, and 
foresees a significant boost in funding for the commission. (See table 3-6.) In the 2004 to 
2007 quadrennial, the CTI is to see its budget increased by 52% compared to the previous 
period. The supplementary resources demand a broader range of responsibilities, the most 
important of which are listed below: 
 
•  To increase the encouragement of and support to entrepreneurship and the creation of 
enterprises; to further develop the CTI Start-up initiative. 
•  Priority to be given to: 
o  Life sciences 
o  Nanotechnology and microsystems technology 
o  Information and communications technology 
•  Widening the scope of activities in the field of international collaborations, 
specifically in the frameworks of ESA (European Space Agency), EUREKA and the 
IMS.  
•  To develop core competences of R&D in the HES. 
•  To encourage more high-risk projects ("discovery projects"), with potential for high 
commercial value. 
•  To educate the youth on science and technology. 
 
Table 3-6: CTI budget / Message 2004-2007 (CHF millions) 
 










79 92  112  123  140  467  308 159  (52) 
Entrepreneurship 
Promotion  














20 22 31 38 49  140     
 






14,5  16 17 16 16 65     
 
Source: Vision No. 1/2003. 
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3.4 SPP  Biotechnology 
 
The Swiss Priority Programme Biotechnology (SPP Biotechnology) was launched in 1992 
with public funds. A total of six research modules in biotechnology
49 and complementary 
activities in continuing education, information, communication, technology assessment, and 
technology transfer were designated to receive state support over a period of 10 years, ending 
December 2001. The main objective of SPP Biotechnology was to consolidate strategic, 
applied biotechnology research in Switzerland. More specifically, the Swiss Parliament set 
out the following goals to be achieved by the priority programme: 
 
•  To strengthen research in promising areas. 
•  To emphasise application-oriented or problem-solving research. 
•  To ensure the international competitiveness of Swiss biotechnology R&D. 
•  To encourage joint projects in fundamental research, applied research and 
development. 
•  To provide favourable conditions for innovation in existing or newly created centers 
of excellence in biotechnology. 
•  To create national and international networks of collaborators in universities, other 
public research institutes, industry and administration. 
•  To build the infrastructure necessary for biotechnology information communication, 
biosafety research and technology transfer involving, in particular, SMEs. 
 
The 10-year priority program gave birth to 18 spin-offs employing over 300 people, and 
attracted investments topping CHF 40 million from the private sector and CHF 60 million in 
venture capital. In addition, numerous patents, licenses and transfers were facilitated thanks to 
the program. Furthermore, three offices were created in the framework of SPP Biotechnology; 
the Swiss Agency for Biotechnology Information and Communication (BICS), the Center for 
Biosafety Assessment, Technology and Sustainability (BATS)
50, and the technology transfer 
office Unitectra
51, the latter two of which still have operational offices in Basel today. 
 
Prof. Oreste Ghisalba, a veteran of the pharma-industry with Novartis, directed the 
programme during its ten-year span. An interview with Prof. Ghisalba was conducted for the 













                                                 
49   "Bioelectronics and Neuro-informatics", "Food Biotechnology", "Proteins for Medical Applications", 
"Bioengineering and Biocatalysis", "Biotechnology of Higher Plants". 
50 www.bats.ch. 
51 www.unitectra.ch.   26





The terms “biotechnology” and “biotech industry” are often used in a causal and imprecise 




•  Biotechnology 
A group of techniques and technologies that apply the principles of genetics, 
immunology and molecular, cellular and structural biology to the discovery and 
development of novel products.
53 
•  Biotechnology Industry 
The Swiss industry is composed of around 240 private companies
54 (Unitectra, SPP 
BioTech, 2001) that apply various biotechnologies to develop commercially viable 
products. The biotech industry is typically an input in the health care, food and 
agriculture, industrial processes, and environmental cleanup industries. 
•  Pharmaceutical Industry 
This industry is composed of private companies whose products involve design, 
discovery, development and marketing of new agents for the prevention, treatment and 
cure of disease. Pharmaceutical firms rely heavily on scientific research. The industry 
may be evolving towards a new name, the “biopharmaceutical industry”, which 
reflects the strong reliance of pharmaceutical companies on biotechnology. 
•  Medical Research 
This relates to science-based inquiry, both basic and applied, where the goal is the 
improvement in health and the eradication or mitigation of disease and disability. 
 
 
4.2  Biotechnology in Switzerland 
 
Geographically, the large majority of all Swiss companies active in biotechnology are situated 
in one of the three main areas, i.e. Basel, Lake Geneva region (Lausanne/Geneva), and Zurich. 
The role played by the universities (Universities of Basel, Zurich, Lausanne and Geneva) and 
Federal Institutes of Technology (EPF Lausanne and ETH Zurich) has to be underlined, 
particularly in the field of the creation of new ventures or technology transfer policies 
(Unitectra, SPP BioTech, 2001, p. 7 ff). Moreover, the proximity of the major pharmaceutical 
companies in Basel, Novartis and Roche, or the multinational biotech company Serono in the 
French speaking part of Switzerland, represents another important factor of localization. 
 
                                                 
52 See Rosenberg (1999) in Audretsch (2001). 
53  The definition given by the European Federation of Biotechnology is as follows: “Biotechnology is the 
integration of natural sciences and engineering sciences in order to achieve the application of organism, cells, 
parts thereof and molecular analogues for products and services.” In Unitectra, SPP BioTech (2001, p. 7). 
54 This number is composed of 120 “biotech companies” (or entirely “dedicated” biotech companies), which 
have their business focus on modern biotechnology, and 120 “other companies with biotech activities”, including 
firms whose activities in modern biotechnology represent only a part of their activities. Another 19 companies 
are classified as “biotech consulting companies”. Referring to Ernst & Young (2003), the total number of 
dedicated Swiss biotechnology companies is 129, including 124 private and 5 public companies.   27
Another role in the development of the Swiss biotechnology sector can be attributed to the 
SPP Biotechnology (1992-2001) of the SNSF, which contributed to the creation of 18 new 
companies. Also noteworthy is the Novartis Venture Fund, which represents an important 
instrument in supporting innovative ventures, particularly in the life sciences. (See Figure 4-1). 
Finally, in 2001, the SNSF launched the first 14 NCCRs, thus giving Switzerland a new tool 
with which to further improve its international competitiveness in the world of research. In the 
field of life sciences, four NCCRs have been initiated, i.e. the NCCR Genetics, the NCCR 
Neuro, the NCCR Structural Biology, and the NCCR Molecular Oncology.
55 
 
Of all Swiss biotech companies, 40% are manufacturers of biotechnology goods and 22% are 
suppliers. Service companies (25%) have activities in DNA synthesis, analytical services, 
planning and engineering of plants, etc. The remaining 13% (R&D companies) are typically 
start-up companies which do not as yet sell their own products, but carry out R&D projects 
either on their own or in co-operation with other companies. (See Figure 4-2). 
 
Figure 4-1:               Figure 4-2: 



























Source: Unitectra, SPP BioTech (2001).       Source: Unitectra, SPP BioTech (2001). 
 
 
Table 4-1 lists the broad range of market segments covered by the different biotech 
companies in Switzerland: 
 
Table 4-1: Number of companies in different fields of activity 
Note: Some companies appear in more than one type. 
Laboratory equipment  56 Bioelectronics/Bioinformatics 11
Bioreactors/Equipment/ Engineering  36 Environmental treatment/Waste disposal  9
Pharmaceuticals/Therapeutics/Vaccines 32 Cell  culture  8
Reagents/Biochemicals 31 Chemicals  7
Consulting 25 Food  7
Diagnostics 24 Agriculture  6
Contract R&D/Contract Manufacturing  22 Biomaterials  5
Platform technologies  18 Medical devices  5
Bioseparation/Down Stream Processing  15 Cosmetic/Health/Beauty products  3
Analytical services/Quality control  13 Veterinary  3
Source: Unitectra, SPP BioTech (2001). 
 
                                                 
55 See SNSF (2001).   28
In 2000, Swiss private companies have been asked for the first time about their R&D 
participation in biotechnology, i.e. what is the expenditure devoted to R&D in 
biotechnology?
56  (SFSO, economiesuisse, 2001) Referring to this survey, 4% (CHF 300 
million) of the total amount (CHF 7710 million) devoted to intramuros R&D is committed to 
biotechnology. Four economic branches (research laboratories, pharmacy and chemistry, 
machinery and metallurgy, and food products) ensure almost the total R&D work in this 
research field. (See Figure 4-3). 
 
In this same survey, the “protection and promotion of human health” is advanced as being the 
main target of R&D. 71% of intramuros expenditures are devoted to that aim, followed by 
“chemical industry products” (13%) and “productivity and industrial technologies”. (See 
Figure 4-4). The economic branches strongly active in R&D work dedicate an important part 
of their financial resources to the “protection and promotion of human health”. The branch 
“machinery and metallurgy” allocates 94% of its R&D expenditures in biotechnology to this 
objective, “research laboratories” spend 84%, and “pharmacy and chemistry” 68%, while the 
branch “food products” contributes with just 10% of its total R&D expenditures. The latter 
favors “productivity and industrial technologies” and “non-oriented research” (SFSO, 
economiesuisse, 2001, p. 10). 
 
Figure 4-3:               Figure 4-4: 
Intramuros R&D expenditures in 































Source: SFSO, economiesuisse (2001).       Source: SFSO, economiesuisse (2001). 
 
 
4.2.1  Swiss biotech organizations
57 
 
Unitectra is the technology transfer organization of the universities of Berne and Zurich and 
the Swiss National Science Foundation’s SPP Biotechnology. Founded in 1999, and based on 
Biotectra (the technology transfer office established by the SPP Biotechnology in 1996), 
Unitectra is a non-profit making limited company owned by the universities of Berne and 
Zurich. Its mission is the promotion and support of co-operation and knowledge and 
technology transfer between private enterprise and the partner universities as well as other 
                                                 
56 Since 1983, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) and economiesuisse (the largest umbrella organization 
covering the Swiss economy) organize every four years a survey on expenditure and human resources devoted to 
R&D by Swiss companies. 
57 See also section 3.4.   29
research and educational institutions or other third parties. In particular, Unitectra assists 
research collaborations, the protection of intellectual property, licenses, the creation of spin-
off companies, and the education and training on technology transfer related aspects. To 
mention that Unitectra operates three local contact offices located in Berne, Zurich and Basel 
(Unitectra, SPP BioTech, 2001, p. 11). 
 
The VSBU
58 is the Association of Swiss Biotechnology Companies (ASBC) founded in 1998. 
The majority of its approximately 100 member companies are SMEs from various segments 
of modern biotechnology. Its primary goals are to act as a central platform for the further 
development of the Swiss biotech sector, to be a partner in the planning of biotech activities, 
but also in the integration of the Swiss biotech scene into the European scene and into global 
regulatory compliance, and to act as a catalyst of technology transfer throughout the industry 
(Unitectra, SPP BioTech, 2001, p. 13). 
 
 
4.3  Innovation in biotechnology 
 
The major determinants of market structure in the international biopharmaceutical industry 
include a number of factors, i.e. the research system under study and its linkages, industrial 
structures, financing of innovation, intellectual property, and public perceptions. These factors 
play an important role in determining the activities and structure of the biopharmaceutical 
industry and the innovation system (OECD, 1998). Regulatory aspects are addressed 
separately. 
 
The development of biotechnology presumes a strong science base and the ability to form 
horizontal links with many other disciplines. University-industry links, accompanied by a 
gradual blurring of the boundaries between academia and industry (Ronchi, 1998), constitute 
important channels for the development of new technologies. Significant private sector 
involvement in biomedical research highlights the fact that with the introduction of modern 
biotechnology, research outputs are more easily transferred to the private sector making the 
distinction between basic and applied research less clear. Moreover, recent public policy has 
deeply changed the constraints and incentives which influence the development of new 
medical technologies and products. Thus, the aim is to encourage academic and research 
institutions to work with private firms to improve basic research, technology development, 
and technology transfer. 
 
Kanavos (1998) examined the factors affecting industrial structures for innovation, studying 
especially those specific to the pharmaceutical sector, such as the “three-tier demand system” 
(patient, doctor and reimbursing agency), and implications such as the close dependence on 
the actions of governments or economies of scale in research and marketing. Referring to 
Kanavos, it might appear that the future of the pharmaceutical/biopharmaceutical industry in 
OECD countries depends on generous pricing of newly patented products and further mergers 
of firms to lack the size required to stay in the top of the league. On the other hand, mergers 
and acquisitions may reduce research options and the probability of technological advances, 
since new entrants are vital for any industry. Hence, an important task for public policies is to 
strengthen the innovative potential of SMEs, especially in Europe and Japan, where the 
entrepreneurial spirit should also become more aggressive. 
 
                                                 
58 German name: Vereinigung Schweizer Biotechnologie-Unternehmen.   30
The financing of innovation in biotechnology presents substantial differences across countries. 
An important aspect of finance is the facility for start-up biotechnology companies to reach 
the stage where they can seek listing in capital markets and hence raise capital. The small size 
of these companies and the fact that in their early years they often do not have a product on 
which to trade, makes listing not easy. The availability of venture capital (VC) is generally 
invoked as a fundamental element of American leadership in biotechnology. The United 
States have the largest pool of venture capital, essential for the initial phases of biotechnology 
product development. Flexible listing requirements and early “exit routes” through which to 
realize capital gains are part of a set of facilities encouraging investment by “business angels” 
and venture capitalists in companies who need start-up and early-stage finance. European 
venture capital still lags considerably behind US volumes, mainly due to the fragmentation of 
markets and to regulations which in some countries make it more difficult for early investors 
to realize capital gains via the “exit route”. (See Figure 4-5). In Switzerland, the capital raised 
by private equity managers in 1999 totaled CHF 960 million, over two-and-a-half times the 
amount reported for the previous year. In 2000, this amount increased again, reaching more 
than CHF 1.5 billion of raised funds. Total investment amounted for more than CHF 700 


































Source: based on data form the EVCA (2002). 
 
 
Moreover, despite the availability of a number of sources of finance for biotechnology, 
including initial public offerings (IPOs) and R&D limited partnerships, these sources are 
subject to uncertainty. Thus, strategic alliances between biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies have become a popular and less risky way of financing innovation in the former. 
Finally, national governments and supra-national institutions, such as the European 
Commission, also play an important role in financing innovation or in establishing for 
example an appropriate legislative framework for the transfer of technology from national 
laboratories to the private sector for development. 
 
An emphasis has to be put on the ever-increasing importance of intellectual property rights 
(IPR). Moreover, the evolution of internationally regimes for intellectual property is of great   31
significance for biotechnology as it enters the age of genomics. In a research-intensive 
industry, effective protection of intellectual property rights is fundamental. Patenting in 
biotechnology, especially in connection with human genes and/or living organisms, has 
become highly controversial, both within countries and in the international context. Apart 
from the question of patent legislation itself, several side-issues exist which are related not to 
the nature of the legislation but to its implementation, e.g. the backlog of applications which 
increases both costs and uncertainty, enforcement, or licensing requirements. 
 
Public perceptions and attitudes can affect in an important way the economic and regulatory 
conditions (infra) under which an industry operates (Allansdottir et al., 2002, p. 83). Their 
impact can be felt through supply channels (e.g., the attraction towards young graduates and 
scientists, perceived social utility of related research, and perceived risk factors with respect 
to financial conditions), the economics of the production or on the demand for the products 
and techniques that this industry puts on the market. For example, in assessing public 
acceptance of innovation and the potential impact of biotechnology, one must be aware of the 
different views of consumer groups, on the one hand, and specific patient/disease groups, on 
the other. Hence, the degree of public acceptability of an innovation, particularly in the field 
of biotechnology/pharmaceuticals, will depend on the degree to which a drug or new 
technology meets “real” needs (OECD, 1998, p. 13). 
 
 
4.3.1  Overall regulatory stance 
 
Regulation is normally specific to the field of application and the technology. In general, there 
cannot be any clear sentence over its role as short-term effects may be different from long-
term ones. Nevertheless, regulatory framework conditions can have a major impact on the 
competitiveness of biotechnology (Allansdottir et al., 2002, p. 83).
59 
 
One of the main reasons for government intervention in the health-care industry is uncertainty, 
as well as ensuring equity, equality of access, and transparent provision of information for 
consumer awareness. In this context, regulation – including both authorization for release 
products, and post-release monitoring – can be considered as an instrument for reducing and 
protecting people from the risks linked to such uncertainty. Hence, developing regulatory 
guidelines for new technologies means striking a balance between public concern over 
unknown technological risks and guidelines that promote research on promising new 
treatments. Indeed, governments have to reconcile their role in promoting and maintaining an 
internationally competitive research-based industry with their regulatory objectives in health 
and safety policy, without neglecting public expenditure goals (OECD, 1998, p. 14 ff). 
 
Biotechnology, as applied to the development of human therapeutic products, has certainly 
provided and will continue to supply innovative technologies to support the discovery of new 
diseases and therapies. Thus, to realize the potential in this technology, without 
underestimating its risks, governments have to create policies to advance innovation through 
regulatory practices, economic incentives, investment in research and development, and a 
clear commitment to provide for its citizens the benefit of these technological progresses. 
 
                                                 
59 Referring  to  Gaskell  et al. (2000), the European public discriminates quite clearly among the fields of 
application of biotechnology. It is rather neutral about agricultural biotechnology but opposed to both genetically 
modified food and the cloning of animals. On the other side, perceptions of medical and environmental 
biotechnology are very positive.   32
Biotechnology-derived pharmaceuticals are exposed to the same regulatory rules as traditional 
pharmaceuticals. The speed of approval is crucial for marketing and capture of market share 
as biotechnology companies are extremely sensitive in this respect due to the capital 
constraints they face. Adding to the costs of biotechnology companies, long approval times 
increase the need for funds, and consequently call for the formation of strategic partnerships. 
This shows in what way the regulatory environment can influence the financial requirements 
and hence the structure of a whole industry. 
 
Cost containment and efficient use of resources are central elements in health-care reforms 
across OECD countries. At the same time, the emphasis on cost control is expected to 
influence the dissemination of biopharmaceutical products, due to their high cost. In fact, very 
few OECD governments allow the pharmaceutical industry to freely determine prices of 
commercial goods. For this reason and as the effort to contain costs increases, an effective 
mechanism is needed to guarantee a certain price level for the industry. Finally, the challenge 
for biotechnology is twofold. First is whether it can deliver therapies for a wide range of 
diseases, thus confronting short to medium cost concerns with possible long run cost 
reductions. Second is whether the new technology will make it possible to move towards 
effective prevention of disease, in which case the long-term benefits, in terms of increased 
quality of life, will exceed the short-term costs. 
 
To conclude, one can observe a permanent tension between regulation and innovation in the 
field of modern biotechnology. Governments are confronted with the problem of managing a 
complex process, with a range of policy instruments, uncertainties about their effects, and a 
continuing flow of new scientific knowledge and potential innovations. Through 
harmonization, standardization, mutual acceptance of test results and data, further economy of 
effort and the facilitation of collaboration and trade are reachable. Finally, market access and 
economies of scale encourage and facilitate corresponding internationalization of the industry, 
and thus the whole innovation process. To summarize, the roles of government can be seen as 
promoter of research and innovation, controller of costs, market access and reimbursement 
conditions, and “intelligent facilitator” (OECD, 1998, p. 17). 
 
Referring to USTR (2002, pp. 392-395), Switzerland has taken a pragmatic, case-by-case 
approach to biotechnology products since voters defeated in 1998 a referendum (Gene 
Protection Initiative) to ban biotechnology research and release of biotechnology products 
into the environment, in part due to concerns about the impact of this proposal on Medical 
research. Nevertheless, biotechnology products remain somewhat controversial. In general, 
approval of biotechnology products has been slower than in the United States and the 
European Union which has led to situations where products approved elsewhere were banned 
in Switzerland (USTR, 1999, p. 385 ff). Foods and additives that have been genetically 
engineered need approval for consumer marketing through certification by the Swiss Federal 
Office of Public Health (SFOPH) and the manufacturer of a genetically engineered food 






4.4 International  comparisons
60 
                                                 
60 This part is based on van Beuzekom (2001).   33
 
Further the statistics already presented on strategic alliances (chapter I) and venture capital 
(supra), some more statistics on biotechnology are given in this section. They concern patents, 
bibliometrics, trade, and government funding for biotechnology R&D. 
 
 
4.4.1   Biotechnology and patents 
 
The absolute number of USPTO
61 and EPO
62 biotechnology patents has grown significantly 
in comparison with the total number of patents (van Beuzekom, 2001, p. 10 ff). Between 1990 
and 2000, the number of biotechnology patents increased by 15% at the USPTO, compared to 
an increase of just 5% for all patents taken together. A similar trend can be observed at the 
EPO, with an increase of 10.5% for biotechnology patents between 1990 and 1997, and 5% 
for patents, overall. To note that at both the USPTO and the EPO the top six biotechnology 
“patenters” are identical, with differences starting at the seventh position where a clear 
geographical bias appears. 
 
National shares of all biotechnology USPTO patents have changed between 1990 and 2000 
for only two countries in a significant way. The US increased its share by 9%, while the one 
for Japan declined by 11%. At the EPO, national shares of all biotechnology patent 
applications between 1990 and 1997 has changed noticeably in only Japan, with a decline of 
6%. To mention also that USPTO growth rates of biotechnology patents are positive in all 
countries for the 1990-2000 time period, and positive in the large majority of countries who 
applied at the EPO for the 1990-1997 period. (See Figures 4-6 and 4-7). 
 
Figure 4-6:               Figure 4-7: 
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Source: IIP
63 in Cueni and Engler (1997).       Source: IIP in Cueni and Engler (1997). 
 
 
4.4.2  Biotechnology and bibliometrics 
                                                 
61 United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
62 European Patent Office. 
63 Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property.   34
 
One possible measure of scientific output by a country in a particular field such as 
biotechnology and applied microbiology is the share of publications in scientific journals. The 
share of such publications for most selected countries (European countries, as well as for 
Canada, Japan and the United States) has remained stable over time even though the number 
of biotechnology articles more than doubled, from 1574 in 1986 to 3261 in 1998 (van 
Beuzekom, 2001, p. 14 ff). It is noteworthy to mention that the United States and Japan 
account for about a third of all publications in these fields. (See Figure 4-8). 
 
The relative impact of a particular paper is based on the number of citations made to it by 
other published work. Thus, if a paper has more citations than the average for its field, i.e. 
biotechnology and applied microbiology, it has an above average impact. Over the 1986-1998 
period, Switzerland, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States and Germany had 
above average impact rates, ranging from 1.8 for Switzerland to 1.3 for Germany, while Spain, 
Japan, France and Italy had below average impacts.
64 (See Figure 4-9). 
 
National profiles of relative scientific specialization can be obtained from the distribution of 
published articles by field and comparing this to the average (van Beuzekom, 2001, pp. 17-
18). Based on publications from 1998, the results show that each country analyzed
65 has an 
above average strength in at least one health/bio-medical area. The United Kingdom was the 
strongest across all the health/bio-medical fields, while Italy and to a lesser extent the United 
States were strong as well. Japan was well below average in just a few of the fields. In the 
case of biomedical engineering, the field with some of the strongest links to biotechnology, 
the United States, Germany, and Canada were above average, while Japan, France, and 
Australia were below. 
 
Figure 4-8:               Figure 4-9: 
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4.4.3  Biotechnology and trade 
                                                 
64 For example, a Swiss paper published over the 1986-1998 period received 80% above the average number of 
citations, while a Japanese paper (0.8) received 20% under the average number. 
65 Countries analyzed include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US.   35
 
There is no existing trade data that is specifically limited to biotechnology products. 
Nevertheless, an important database is offered by the US Census Bureau, which defines 
“biotechnology products” as a group that is almost completely based on biologics. However, 
this definition both includes many products that are not part of advanced biotechnology, and 
excludes other important biotechnologies. 
 
Referring to the US Census Bureau, US biotechnology exports to OECD countries amounted 
in 1999 to more than USD 1.34 as compared to imports of USD 970 million from OECD 
countries. At the same time, more than 80% of US biotechnology exports and imports went to, 
respectively came from, seven OECD countries. 
 
Belgium (24% of exports and 26% of imports), and to some extent the United Kingdom, are 
more or less equally represented in the US export and import balance sheet. The other three 
leading destinations for US biotechnology products in 1999 were Japan (20%), Germany 
(9.1%) and Canada (15.2%), but both Japan and Germany were not among the major 
providers of US imports and Canada’s share amounted to only 7.2%. Switzerland (11.7%), 
Ireland (6.9%) and, in a less important way, France (13.1%) and the Netherlands (10.6%) are 
major exporters of biotechnology to the United States but are less significant importers. 
National specializations and weak intra-industry trade might be an explanation for this (van 
Beuzekom, 2001, p. 22). 
 
 
4.4.4  Biotechnology and government funding 
 
Data on government appropriations can provide an indication of the relative importance of 
biotechnology funding. The median contribution of government budgets in OECD countries 
devoted to biotechnology is 3.5% in 1997. But the spread between different countries is large, 
ranging between 0.4% (Italy) to 13.8% (Belgium). In absolute PPP$ terms, Germany spends 
the most on biotechnology followed by the United Kingdom and France. (See Figure 4-10). 
 
Figure 4-10: 
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Source: based on data from the European Commission (2000), Eurostat, Statistics Canada, 
and national sources.   36
V  Swiss Biotechnology: A Case Study 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the results from 14 interviews we have conducted with key actors in 
the field of biopharmaceuticals in Switzerland, mainly in its three major clusters, i.e. the Basel 
region, the greater Zurich area, and the Geneva-Lausanne area. In the case of a private 
company, we were first interested in the creation of the company itself, its origin and 
motivation. Second, we were looking at the knowledge network the company or institution is 
involved in, specifically the links existing between universities and private companies, but 
also between private companies themselves (strategic alliances). Third, we were interested in 
institutional factors (availability of capital, intellectual property, public opinion) influencing 
the biopharmaceutical landscape in Switzerland. And finally, we sought to understand the 
impact of public support of biotechnology via research programs, with a special focus on the 
SPP Biotechnology, and the formation of clusters in biotechnology. (See appendix 1a and 1b.)  
 
The order in which the interviews are presented refers to the three Swiss clusters in 
biopharmaceuticals we were analyzing: First, the Basel region; second, the greater Zurich 
area; and third, the Geneva-Lausanne area. Finally, two companies located outside those 
clusters are presented. 
 
 
5.1  The Basel region 
 
5.1.1  Actelion Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. 
 
Interview with Dr. Walter Fischli, Senior Vice President, Head of Drug Discovery, and Co-
Founder, on November 27, 2002. 
 
Actelion, founded in late 1997, is a biopharmaceutical company with its headquarters in the 
Innovation Center in Allschwil/Basel – counting more than 400 employees in March 2003. 
The company is focusing on the discovery and development of innovative synthetic small 
molecular weight drugs. The focus of research is the endothelium, which is the innermost 
fibrosis layer of blood vessels and plays a role in cardiovascular diseases, inflammation, 
fibrosis, and many types of cancer. For its research activities, Actelion combines technologies 
from molecular biology and medicinal chemistry to clinical development, and also benefits 
from a worldwide international collaboration.  
Tracleer, an orally available dual endothelin receptor antagonist, has been approved as a 





Actelion was founded by four researchers active in drug discovery working for Hoffmann-La 
Roche (Roche) in Basel. Successful work of the respective research groups and a certain lack 
of recognition by Roche finally led to a breakaway. As the proposal of a spin-off made to 
Roche was rebuked, the company was entirely created with the researchers’ own saved 
private money without receiving any financial support from Roche. With exception to one 
bank guarantee, the company did neither receive public support: No agreement could be 
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achieved with the CTI, and the cantonal government of Basel-Land was reluctant as the 
company did – logically – not make profits at this time. 
 
The first financing round of the company comprised five investors, and the second round was 
followed by an IPO. Therefore, new shares have been raised in favor of the company. In 
general, it is difficult in the beginning of a company’s life to find investors without overly 
stringent requirements. Networking and contacts are therefore very important. Access to 
qualified personnel is considered as non-problematic, especially as the company was able to 
benefit from an extensive already-existing network. Indeed, Actelion started with four people, 
and now there are more than 500 employees worldwide (including Hesperion, Ltd.). The 
Basel region was the only site that was taken into consideration by Actelion. Reasons for this 
decision are the unique pharmaceutical environment, access to specialists and skills, and its 
firmly implanted industry. 
 
Various links exist between Actelion and academia or public research institutes. There are 
collaborations with a Paris hospital, the Bangkok University, and several research institutes in 
Japan and other countries. One product has been developed together with the Swiss Tropical 
Institute, and the company approached the World Health Organization (WHO) for a 
collaboration on malaria vaccines. In addition, many students from Switzerland, Germany and 
France are working at Actelion while doing their diploma works or post-doctoral studies in 
chemistry, biology, and other fields. There are also many active links with industry including 
small companies and Big Pharma. Usually, Actelion tries to get into collaborations when there 
is a general need for them. 
 
The quality of education in Switzerland is qualified as very good as it is more pragmatic than 
in the US. Moreover, according to Dr. Fischli, there is a huge advantage in Switzerland 
compared to the US in chemistry, structural development, and drug development; on the other 
hand, the US has an advantage in basic research. However, Basel is “still considered number 
1” in biopharmaceuticals. 
 
IP is of extreme importance for every biopharmaceutical company. During only four 
operational years, Actelion applied for over 30 patents which are all drug-discovery related, 
mostly covering compounds. The strategy of Actelion is to patent as much as possible, except 
for processes. As tremendous expertise is necessary in this field, a former patent division 
director of Roche has been appointed to do this job. 
 
The public opinion has a big influence on the biopharmaceutical industry. The acceptance of 
the national referenda on animal protection (1985, 1992, 1993) could have meant – quoting 
Dr. Fischli – "the end of the Swiss pharmaceutical industry". In his opinion, Switzerland  
already has a very good system of animal protection. The biotechnology industry is certainly 
dependent on the public opinion but should not bend to it as it has to maintain its 
independence. 
 
Actelion was not an active participant of the SPP Biotechnology, but several collaborations 
resulted from this program. There is an active collaboration with the NCCR Neuro (Neural 
Plasticity and Repair) on brain research. Furthermore, Actelion applied for a European grant 
and got involved in the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) at the World Health 
Organization (WHO), but were soon confronted with stifling bureaucracy. To improve the 
collaboration between academia and industry, much more financial support is needed than 
often realized by universities. Also universities cannot be involved in all steps of, for example,   38
drug discovery: they are competent in research, but – referring to Dr. Fischli – the final 
product is out of their reach. 
 
In general, there should be more concrete action and less talk from local authorities in 
supporting clustering as they could help a lot. The Innovation Center in Allschwil/Basel (like 
the Biotech Center Zurich-Schlieren) is a private venture with no support from the two local 
governments (Basel-Land and Basel-City). The BioValley initiative is good for companies 
that lack networks and contacts but is for this reason less interesting to Actelion.
67 Referring 
to Dr. Fischli, this network should be more active in pro-active support and clustering as start-
ups need immediate access to adequate working facilities. 
 
 
5.1.2  F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG 
 
Interview with Prof. Dr. Klaus Müller, Head of Science & Technology Relations and 
Secretary-General of Roche Research Foundation, on November 27, 2002. 
 
Roche is a leading, worldwide active research-orientated healthcare company with core 
businesses in pharmaceuticals, diagnostics, vitamins and fine chemicals. The company, 
headquartered in Basel, was founded in 1896 and employs today approximately 70.000 
people in 170 countries. The innovative achievements of Roche are mainly due to long-
standing investment in R&D, particularly in modern biotechnology. In 2002, the Roche Group 
achieved sales of CHF 29.7 billion and invested more than 4 billion in R&D. For the same 




Roche is involved in a huge array of alliances with multinationals and SMEs around the world. 
In 2001, Roche and Chugai announced that they would enter into an alliance to create a 
leading research-driven Japanese pharmaceutical company. To broaden its range and fortify 
its position, Roche has also made some key acquisitions. A majority share in Genentech, a 
worldwide leading biotechnology company, reinforces the position of Roche in the promising 
new field of pharmaceuticals produced by means of biotechnology. 
 
For Prof. Müller, academia represents an “important partner for new ideas”. Exchanging ideas, 
learning together, and being in contact with academia are key elements for technology-driven 
companies such as Roche. For example, several research groups with international scope 
inside Roche collaborate with groups outside the company. While working together on 
feasibility issues, they may develop a prototype, and later on an entirely new product. In this 
context it is worth mentioning the fundamental importance of IP issues, especially relating to 
diagnostics. 
 
But there are also sabbaticals for Roche collaborators or PhD students working for the 
company. All this is part of a process of mutual learning, e.g. learning about other 
technologies. The interaction with other people and the in-house validation of worldwide 
technologies will then allow the transfer of technology. As a result, Roche is permanently 
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coordinates the exchange of know-how and technology among research institutions, organizations, industry, and 
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moving between basic and applied research. By the way, the Roche Symposium for leading 
bioscientists and chemists is constantly on the look for new talents. 
 
Following Prof. Müller, the government is able to influence clustering, mainly by increasing 
its research spending. Even though Roche influenced in a positive way the creation of the 
NCCRs, Prof. Müller is not fully convinced about investing substantial amounts of public 
money in “networks”. The important thing is to focus on particular issues and to foster certain 
issues. In general, a multinational like Roche is not in the need to join a national research 
program, as the company is open to any development worldwide. 
 
The public opinion plays an extremely important role in the field of the life sciences. But this 
doesn’t mean that campaigns influencing the public opinion have to be aggressive. Though it 
was very important for Swiss biopharmaceutical companies that the Gen-Lex initiative was 
accepted (thus refusing the Gene Protection initiative), companies, unlike universities or 
hospitals, always have the possibility to move out of a country. For Prof. Müller, it is 
important to bring the life sciences into schools and colleges, thus influencing the public 
opinion from the early beginning. But this also means that more partners are needed, for 
example from academia or via the creation of a Swiss organization for life sciences. 
 
 
5.1.3  Ecovac GmbH 
 
Interview by telephone with Dr. Helmut Eckert, Founder of Ecovac and Co-Founder of 
igeneon AG, on December 2, 2002. 
 
Founded in 1996, Ecovac GmbH is located in the Canton of Basel-Land (Oberwil). 





With 30 years of experience in senior R&D positions at Sandoz, Dr. Eckert left the company 
after its merger with Ciba-Geigy in 1996. As a result of his pharmaceutical research and 
project work in the field of cancer research, Dr. Eckert created Ecovac with modest resources 
as a limited liability company (LLC), essentially for responsibility reasons. Locating the 
company in proximity to Basel was mainly due to private reasons but also because Basel is an 
important place for services.  
 
Combining university and proper resources, a first product was then developed on self-
initiative in view of a contract allocation. In 1999, Dr. Eckert co-founded igeneon with a 
colleague from Vienna, Austria, thus bringing the product into the new company. Today, 
igeneon employs more than 60 people. 
 
For Dr. Eckert, networking was the essential ingredient for over 30 years of work within 
Sandoz and continues to be a key feature, especially in the case of technology transfer into a 
newly created company like igeneon. For example, due to the network in place, two products 
have been in-licensed to igeneon from Novartis and Protein Design Labs (PDL).  
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Networking with academia is entirely based on personal contacts. Referring to Dr. Eckert, the 
assistance provided by the CTI was not very constructive as “direct” assistance is generally 
needed. In fact, together with the chamber of commerce, the CTI proposed different 
laboratories which were not very helpful in the end. Hence the real infrastructure that is 
needed is the university itself. 
 
In 1999, igeneon was founded with venture capital mainly (30%) from the Novartis Venture 
Fund. Further investors were Bank Austria TFV (now 3i Austria) and Technologieholding 
(now 3i). Other financing resources included the Vienna Business Agency (VBA) 
contributing, together with another public institution, 50% to the research activities of the 
company. According to Dr. Eckert, the same favorable conditions could be found for example 
in Munich, Germany. In contrast, “the Swiss can only dream about it”: as there is no big 
venture capital firm, the first hurdle to clear for an emerging company in Switzerland is very 
difficult. 
 
Concerning regulatory and institutional factors in the biopharmaceutical field in Switzerland, 
they can be considered as quite neutral and similar in comparison to other European countries. 
Bearing in mind the strategic importance of IP, related issues are particularly well organized 
in Switzerland. 
 
Even though Dr. Eckert was never directly concerned by public research programs, he 
assisted people involved in such programs. For example, in the eyes of Dr. Eckert, Unitectra 
Technology Transfer and the SPP BioTech Program Direction have fulfilled a very useful 
function. Dr. Eckert also helped as a consultant in the framework of the BioTechPark 
Freiburg/Germany and the Innovation Center Allschwil/Basel. To entirely appreciate the 
success of those institutions, input-output analysis are necessary. Nevertheless, they provide a 
basis for useful interactions and synergies between involved companies, and are able to offer 
infrastructure for biopharmaceutical companies. 
 
 
5.1.4  Speedel Pharma AG 
 
Interview with Mr. Konrad Wirz, CFO, on December 3, 2002. 
 
Speedel Pharma was launched  at the end of 1998 in Basel by a group of pharmaceutical 
industry managers and scientific experts who decided to create a new kind of drug 
development company, explicitly focused on the fast-track development of innovative 
cardiovascular and metabolic drugs. 
The Speedel Group, that works today with a team of 40 pharmaceutical scientists and 
managers, is a privately held company which has secured until this date more than CHF 44 
million in equity and derived development and license revenues in the aggregate amount of 
about CHF 55 million. Speedel in-licenses drug candidates at the end of the discovery phase 
from fully integrated pharmaceutical companies as well as from research and biotechnology 
companies. It also identifies – by Speedel Experimenta AG – own development candidates. 
The ex-front-runner of Speedel’s development portfolio has been Aliskiren (SPP 100), an 
orally active rennin inhibitor, licensed from Novartis Pharma AG in 1999. In summer 2002, 
Novartis has exercised its call-back option for Aliskiren with the goal to further develop this 
compound in order to gain regulatory approval and commercialization in hypertension.
70 
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The only public support Speedel had for its foundation was a favorable agreement with the 
local tax authorities. Because of its rich history in chemistry and pharmaceuticals and the 
possibility to access the best people in the world in the field,  Mr. Wirz considers Basel as a 
very good place to be for a company like Speedel. Even though the quality of education in 
biopharmaceuticals in Switzerland is more than adequate, the real problem resides in the 
quantity of trained people. Hence, it is not surprising that the 40 employees of Speedel, who 
practically all worked for one of the big pharmaceutical companies (Novartis or Hoffmann-La 
Roche) in Basel, come from almost 20 different nations. 
 
Concerning links with academia, Speedel is not involved in any research agreement at this 
point as research activities are still very young. However, there are some university professors 
on the Scientific and Technical Advisory Board of the company. Likewise, there are no 
strategic alliances between Speedel and other companies, apart from the license agreements 
with Big Pharma. 
 
In the field of intellectual property, Mr. Wirz sees no real handicap or substantial differences 
with regard to the US. Though Speedel has no specific IP strategy and while having a legal 
entity in the US, the company tries to keep its IP in Switzerland. There is Speedel employee 
working full-time on patents and IP. The amount of capital available to business is considered 
to be very high in Switzerland. Moreover, technical expertise on biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals is very good. The reverse is that Swiss investors are generally quite risk-
averse in comparison to the US which makes it often difficult to get VC funding. 
 
Public opinion has a great influence on the biopharmaceutical industry but, referring to Mr. 
Wirz, not directly on Speedel. This is especially the case for Switzerland. With regards to 
GMOs, for example, there is a big philosophical difference between the Old and the New 
World, where Switzerland and Europe as a whole, stand to lose out to the US.  
 
Concerning national or European research programs, Speedel has not participated in any 
program until now. Even though measures supporting clusters in biotechnology are not easy 
to define, Mr. Wirz is sure that regional authorities could influence them in a positive way. As 
the Basel region, with its traditional links to France and Germany, already represents a unique 
place for biopharmaceuticals, it should be the ideal place to promote. On the other hand, it is 
still difficult to see the fruits of, for example, the BioValley initiative. 
 
 
5.1.5  Novartis Pharma AG 
 
Interview with Prof. Dr. Oreste Ghisalba, Former Program Director of SPP Biotechnology, on 
February 7, 2003. 
 
Novartis is a world leader in health-care with core businesses in pharmaceuticals, consumer 
health, generics, eye-care, and animal health. The company was created in 1996 from the 
merger of the Swiss companies, Ciba and Sandoz. 
In 2002, the Group’s businesses achieved sales of CHF 32.4 billion (USD 20.9 billion) and 
invested approximately 4.3 billion (USD 2.8 billion) in R&D. During the same year, the core 
pharmaceuticals business achieved sales of CHF 21.0 billion (USD 13.6 billion), with the 
cardiovascular and oncology businesses being the main drivers. Headquartered in Basel,   42
Novartis Group companies employ more than 70.000 people and operate in over 140 




Besides his octivities at Novartis Pharma AG and his function as a private lecturer at the 
University of Basel and the EPF Zurich, Prof. Ghisalba is in charge of the organization of 
governmental research programs, like it was the case for the SPP Biotechnology (1992-2001). 
The definition of “biotechnology” used for defining the field of research of this program was 
based on the definition given by the European Federation of Biotechnology which says that 
biotechnology is the combination of natural sciences and engineering sciences.
72 Referring to 
Prof. Ghisalba, the SPP Biotechnology was clearly an application-orientated program, 
including also social aspects such as biosafety, IP issues, technology transfer aspects, etc. 
Even if the program finished at the end of 2001, there are still some activities which continue 
today. 
 
The task of the program directorate, backed by a group of experts in charge of giving input 
and discussing incoming projects, was to control the realization of the program’s goals which 
is particularly important in a new network. These goals were initially set by an international 
and national group of people designing topics that were interesting to Switzerland, either to be 
reinforced or to be newly created. Finally, goals were set in collaboration with the researchers 
in Switzerland, hence also admitting bottom-up definitions. 
 
The outcome of the program was many-fold. Besides the new operating networks which were 
established, 18 start-up companies have been created. In addition to the global program 
budget of CHF 100 million allocated by the Swiss Federation, some CHF 40 million have 
been attracted from industry, as well as more than CHF 60 million of venture capital 
throughout the duration of the program. Beyond its lifetime, the VC invested in the new 
companies amounted to more than CHF 100 million. Moreover, more than 70 licenses and 
patents have been created.
73 
 
The start-up companies created through the SPP Biotechnology generated some 300 new jobs, 
a number which is still increasing. Thanks to the program, services have also been provided to 
people and companies outside the program. For example, Unitectra, today’s technology 
transfer organization of the Universities of Berne and Zurich, assisted in the establishment of 
companies which were not funded by the SPP Biotechnology. National research institutions 
and the public sector have been involved in biosafety research. In addition, a periodical 
(BioTeCH forum) which detailed the results gained from all the projects of the program was 
published throughout the SPP. 
 
The BICS (Biotechnology Information and Communication Switzerland) office was opened 
in Basel in order to inform the public on issues of concern. The importance of the public 
opinion is shown for example in the field of agrobiotechnology where the development in 
Switzerland is blocked at the moment. For Prof. Ghisalba the current attitude is not 
scientifically but rather ideologically motivated. Of the three agencies created under the SPP 
Biotechnology, two are still existing: the already mentioned Unitectra (former Biotectra) and 
the Center for Biosafety and Sustainability (BATS), which gets support from the Basel 
government. (See section 3.4.) 
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Unquestionably, ethical aspects have to be taken into consideration in certain fields such as 
stem cells, and there are admittedly other open questions that exist. That’s why the SPP 
Biotechnology tried to foster a transdisciplinary approach, for example by involving people 
also from the social sciences in publications and technology assessments. Likewise, Prof. 
Ghisalba suggests defining research programs in case of the existence of safety issues. In this 
context, a new research program on bio-safety issues has been proposed to the SNSF which 
might be established by the end of 2003. 
 
For Prof. Ghisalba, the SPP Biotechnology has given a “huge boost” to Swiss research in 
biotechnology. Additionally, the “in-house” evaluation of the situation of Swiss 
biotechnology allowed to change the public perception of biotechnology in Switzerland and 
encouraged finally new people to create new companies. It was shown that there were much 
more biotechnology companies in Switzerland than reported by other previous studies. Since 
the publication of the first Swiss Biotechnology Industry Guide, co-edited by the SPP 
Biotechnology Program Direction, an additional 70 companies have been reported, totaling 
today more than 250 companies (including provider and service companies).
74 
 
Even though a research program has to contain a predefined strategy and clear plans, 
flexibility is another important element as unplanned and unexpected results have to be taken 
into consideration. For instance, Prionics AG, one of the largest companies created through 
the SPP biotechnology was initially never planned to be set up. That’s why for Prof. Ghisalba 
it is definitely possible to create a favorable environment, e.g. for the creation of a new 
company, but it is not possible or wise to plan too far ahead: “If you control too much and if 
you plan too much, you kill innovation!” Finally, trust among people involved in a research 
program is essential. The program direction just intervened when help, support or advice were 
needed. 
 
Referring to Prof. Ghisalba, the SPP Biotechnology can be probably considered as the first 
instrument which allowed an effective collaboration in the field of biotechnology between 
industrial and academic partners in Switzerland. In total, more than 100 companies have been 
associated with the program, with a main focus on SMEs. But collaboration took also place 
between companies. For example, the research results of a collaboration between a big 
company and university were transferred to a smaller company where they were finally put 
into practical application. In fact, big companies are often interested in using certain products 
but without producing them in-house. Therefore, the program led to real networks involving 
several partners creating a technological solution, which constitutes a viable basis for the 
business of a small company. 
 
In addition, the SPP Biotechnology initiated the Association of Swiss Biotechnology 
Companies (ASBC). This step was particularly important to increase the visibility of the 
Swiss biotechnology industry, allowing networking not only on a political level but also on an 
industrial level. 
 
Having been scheduled for ten years, the SPP came to the end of its term in 2001. For Prof. 
Ghisalba, the end of the program was not a finality as such because there is certain continuity 
of the program albeit “on other levels”. For example, the program has been replaced to a 
certain extent by the creation of the NCCRs in Life Sciences. This new program contains 
research and educational aspects, but it also has the duty to do knowledge and technology 
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transfer. This means that research results continue to be made publicly available to industry, 
but in a different set-up of programs with smaller and more focused entities. Specially focused 
on application-orientated research, the CTI offers another alternative to the program. 
Therefore, when the program came to an end, Prof. Ghisalba, former member of the CTI, tried 
to ensure a certain transition from the SPP to the CTI for individuals who were involved in the 
program. Finally, the Universities of Applied Sciences are more recent players in the field. 
Their task, fostered by the CTI, is to conduct application-orientated research. In the case of 
biotechnology, a network – Swiss Biotech Net – has been created, linking several Universities 
of Applied Sciences. 
 
 
5.2  The greater Zurich area 
 
5.2.1  GLYCART Biotechnology AG 
 
Interview with Dr. Joel Jean-Mairet, CEO, on November 27, 2002. 
 
GLYCART biotechnology AG is a company involved in the research, development and 
commercialization of a new generation of antibody-based products for the treatment of 
cancer and other life threatening and debilitating diseases. GLYCART’s core platform 
technology is “GlycoMAb” which enhances the power of monoclonal antibodies. 
Founded in 2000 as a spin-off from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich 
(ETHZ), GLYCART is currently located within the Institute of Biotechnology at the ETHZ in 




After validating the results of research, followed by the decision to formulate a business plan, 
GLYCART was founded as a R&D spin-off from the ETHZ. Support for patent writing and 
technology transfer issues, together with a loan from the Novartis Venture Fund, allowed the 
company to start operations in January 2001. The powerful technology of antibodies, which 
represents today about 25% of all bio-pharmaceutical products that are in development, was a 
sufficient motivation for the creation of the company. 
 
Concerning public support, GLYCART received assistance from Unitectra, the technology 
transfer organization from the Universities of Berne and Zurich, for IP issues. The ETHZ 
allocated a CHF 50.000 credit for the starting of the company which also won an important 
price for innovation. Moreover, support and advice were principally obtained through 
networking with various actors involved in biotechnology. 
 
As already mentioned in the company’s introduction, GLYCART is preparing to move from 
the ETHZ to the new Biotech Center in Zurich-Schlieren. Reasons for moving to the Biotech 
Center are mainly a greater space availability, the existence of top class laboratories, and the 
creation of networks. Other advantages are synergies which can be derived from companies 
already located there, for example through the exchange of personnel and facility sharing. It 
has to be underlined here that the ETHZ is nevertheless considered as an ideal place for start-
ups, especially considering its reasonable rents. Quoting Dr. Jean-Mairet: “I can recommend 
to any biotech start-up to stay as long as possible at the University, because you have a lot of 
resources, access to equipment, libraries, networks, computers, etc.” 
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GLYCART has several ongoing collaborations with public and private institutions. Among 
academic institutions, research links exist with the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois 
(CHUV), the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), and the Institute of Biotechnology of the ETHZ. 
With industry, a sound network exists with several companies, even if there is no concrete 
collaboration or technology transfer for the moment. With big pharmaceuticals, GLYCART is 
close to signing agreements with companies whose names cannot be disclosed yet. Two 
research and license option agreements have been already signed which allow a royalty 
percentage on products with GLYCART technology. Indeed, substantial information flow is 
expected in near future. 
 
The quality of education in life sciences at the ETHZ is considered to be very high. 
Nevertheless, a certain stimulus for entrepreneurship is lacking. The lack of experienced 
technology transfer officers in Switzerland constitutes another handicap. In fact, GLYCART 
is currently dealing with a technology transfer office in the US (California). Moreover, the 
University should also do more to secure financing, especially in the seed phase of a start-up. 
In this context, a lot of progress has still to be made. 
 
As every high-tech company, GLYCART relies on IP, and thus has a very well-defined IP 
strategy. As the company went directly US and international, it is not too much concerned 
about the Swiss IP regulation. However, IP harmonization on a European level is a key issue. 
Concerning capital access, Switzerland is considered a good place to be. In general, the 
availability of capital is high, but the degree of access thereto varies according to the quality 
of one's business plan. Depending on the density of a company’s network, there might be 
direct access to quality investors. 
 
Public opinion definitely influences the biotechnology sector. To create a mutual trust 
between the public and industry, more communication is necessary. Sensitive issues have to 
be well explained to the public, in particular in Switzerland. 
 
Concerning research programs, GLYCART participated in the SPP Biotechnology which 
contributed directly to the success of the foundation of the company. Moreover, referring to 
Dr. Jean-Mairet, this program clearly helped to bridge the gap between university and 
industry, as shown for example by Cytos Biotechnology AG. GLYCART is not involved in a 
CTI project, but the company is currently applying for the CTI Start-up label so as to be 
entitled to government grants in future. Although the company is in a rather advanced stage 
for applying to this label, the critical mass it has reached should be a helpful criterion. 
 
There is no public financial support from the local (Zurich) or federal governments for 
clustering in biotechnology in the Zurich area, even though Dr. Jean-Mairet is certain about 
the influence regional authorities could take on the creation of clusters. Until now, the only 
support provided from the City of Zurich were useful contacts and addresses. 
 
 
5.2.2  The Genetics Company, Inc. 
 
Interview with Prof. Ernst Hafen, Co-Founder and Scientific Director, on January 27, 2003. 
 
The Genetics Company (TGC) was established in May 1998, as a joint spin-off between the 
University of Zurich and the Swiss Institute of Experimental Cancer Research (ISREC) in 
Epalinges/Lausanne. TGC, located in the Biotech Center Zurich-Schlieren, is a drug   46
discovery and development company active in the areas of cancer and neurodegenerative 
diseases. Up to now, TGC has generated a set of small molecules that are able to improve the 
therapies of (colorectal) cancer and Alzheimer’s disease. 
In December 2002, TGC acquired key assets from CallistoGen AG, Berlin, including small 
molecule lead candidates against Alzheimer’s disease and proprietary in silico small 
compound screening, and De Novo design technologies in order to substantially strengthen 




TGC, which currently counts 26 employees, was created by professors of the University of 
Zurich and ISREC in 1998 with the aim of using knowledge from basic research to define 
drug targets in human disease. The company participated in the Venture 1998 business plan 
competition, jointly organized by the ETHZ and McKinsey Switzerland, and received 
distinctions which led to many contacts, especially with investors and lawyers. Moreover, a 
CEO with Big Pharma experience was hired. After having been located initially at the 
University of Zurich, TGC decided to locate in the Biotech Center Zurich-Schlieren due 
mainly to reasons of space and facilities availability while staying close to the University of 
Zurich. 
 
To receive financing, the company contacted major VC companies outside Switzerland, and 
profited from networking opened up by the Venture 1998 competition. TGC received 
financing through the Novartis Venture Fund and Nextech Venture. A second round of 
financing will be soon initiated. The company received a public loan of CHF 100.000 from 
the “Eidgenössische Stiftung zur Förderung schweizerischer Volkswirtschaft durch 
wissenschaftliche Forschung“ that was especially helpful for the foundation of the company. 
In addition to this public support, TGC was awarded the CTI Start-up label, and the company 
received two CTI grants for two different projects. 
 
Recruiting technical assistants working in specialized fields was quite difficult in the 
beginning of the expansion of the company in February 2002, especially as Cytos 
Biotechnology AG was going through a considerable expansion process at the same time thus 
drying up the market for qualified personnel. On the other hand, it was easier to find academic 
scientists and researchers because of the already existing links with academia, but also 
because of Swiss researchers coming back from abroad and preferring to work for a private 
company. Moreover, Germany and France represent another important source of researchers. 
The quality of education is considered to be very high in Switzerland. But, referring to Prof. 
Hafen, it is not the responsibility of universities to produce tailor-made graduates for the 
industry. 
 
Many projects at TGC started as university projects with patents filed with the help from the 
technology transfer office (Unitectra) of the University of Zurich. This was the basis for 
further collaborative research among research groups at university on a contract basis, with an 
IP share regulated individually for each project. In fact, regulations are in place for university-
industry collaborations, but the awareness of how to handle them are missing. That's why 
more experience and knowledge of “what industry wants” is needed. Besides some informal 
contacts, there are no formal collaborations between TGC and other companies at the moment. 
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The importance of IP is very high as it represents the “start-up company’s currency”. 
However, following Prof. Hafen, there is a certain lack of experience and support in this 
domain in Switzerland which asks for a certain degree of self-learning. Access to capital is 
difficult for “early-stage companies” as many VC companies are only interested in companies 
which are close to a product. Therefore, TGC had to look for companies specialized in seed 
financing. The public opinion plays a very important role for biotechnology. In this context, 
the Genprotection Initiative (1998) was a major blow with a fortunate result. In case of 
approval, it would have meant a severe setback to the industry. Lots of time has been spent 
informing the public on the topic, hence reducing anxiety largely promoted by the media. 
 
TGC did not participate in the SPP Biotechnology. In fact, Prof. Hafen considers a bottom-up 
approach more appropriate than top-down research funding like in the case of the SPP 
Biotechnology. TGC participated in two CTI projects and received the CTI Start-up label 
(supra). In general, public funding is fundamental as every young company needs support. 
Concerning the formation of clusters, they are a prerequisite for interaction between 




5.2.3  ESBATech AG 
 
Interview with Dr. Alcide Barberis, CSO, on February 4, 2003. 
 
ESBATech AG, located at the Biotech Center Zurich-Schlieren, is a spin-off company from the 
Institute of Molecular Biology of the University of Zurich. Founded in September 1998 and 
currently employing more than 30 people, the company focuses on medical applied research 
using yeast as a genetic tool. ESBATech has developed several selection processes which are 
used for the identification of new drug targets (functional genomics) as well as the discovery 




The research results of the laboratory of the University of Zurich presented the basis for 
applications in drug discovery, and thus the creation of the company. An effective “launch 
pad” to the ideas was then given by the Venture 1998 business plan competition which 
provided support through a coach and a business angel. The first financing round of the 
company took place in 2000 with the Novartis Venture Fund. A second financing round 
started in 2001 and included Innoventure Capital AG (Credit Suisse), Venture Incubator AG, 
Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch & Cie, Immunology Fund as the lead investor, Novartis 
Venture Fund, HBM BioVentures, BSI New Biomedical Frontier, Difasa Holding, and Peter 
Ohnemus. It has to be mentioned here that the collaboration with Hoffmann-La Roche AG 
was an essential element for the starting of the company. 
 
Access to qualified personnel is not considered as an obstacle, and the quality of education in 
Switzerland is excellent. However, Dr. Barberis regrets the lack of involvement of business 
students in the creation of spin-offs. The location of the company is due to a spontaneous 
move to the Biotech Center Zurich-Schlieren even before it was created. The main reasons for 
this were the availability of top-quality laboratories and the proximity to Cytos Biotechnology 
AG. 
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At present, there are no links with universities. There have been some superficial contacts 
with the University of Geneva for a European project which did not conclude finally. But in 
general, there are no real obstacles in collaborating with academia. Creating links with 
industry has become difficult over the last years as industry is becoming more and more risk-
averse. In fact, it is almost impossible to get financial support unless there is a product. 
Nonetheless, ESBATech is continuously on the look-out for new partnerships. 
 
The first patent filed by ESBATech is owned by the University of Zurich as this was the result 
of research done at the University. In this case, filing was done by the technology transfer 
office of the University of Zurich (Unitectra). Later patents belong to the company and are 
filed by a patent lawyer located in Zurich. Concerning access to capital, until the creation of 
ESBATech, there was no real lack of capital in Switzerland. However, the recent economic 
downturn is drying up money and access to it gets difficult for new biotech start-ups. Even if 
ESBATech does not feel yet any influence of the public opinion on the company’s work, it 
remains a very important issue. If, for example, laws would become too restrictive, 
biotechnology venture funds would move elsewhere. 
 
In March 2000, ESBATech obtained the CTI Start-up label qualifying the company for 
venture capital investments, and initiating a collaboration with the University of Zurich. The 
CTI grant that followed still during the start-up phase (normally used for salaries in 
university-industry collaborations) was part of an agreement with the University of Zurich 
who became shareholder of the company. Regarding public support to clusters in 
biotechnology, Dr. Barberis is in favor of the US approach: The government should facilitate 
clustering, without intervening actively and spending money on the creation of new 
commissions and institutions. Therefore, referring to Dr. Barberis, the government should 
provide good general conditions to companies, e.g. access to already existing clusters, 
working permits, etc. For information, the Biotech Center Zurich-Schlieren was created 
spontaneously, whereas recent discussions on the potential of creating a Biotech Park in 
Zurich were rapidly abandoned. 
 
 
5.3  The Geneva-Lausanne area 
 
5.3.1  NovImmune SA 
 
Interview with Prof. Dr. Bernard Mach, Chairman and CSO, and Mr. Jack Barbut, CEO, on 
December 4, 2002. 
 
NovImmune SA is a start-up company, founded in 1998 and located in Geneva, which is 
dedicated to new therapies for the treatment of autoimmune system diseases and immuno-
suppression for organ transplantation. Initially funded in the seed phase by friend and family 
financing, the company completed its first round of venture financing in July 2000 for CHF 
15 million, with five investors participating. Combining leading scientific discoveries from the 
University of Geneva with a strong business plan, NovImmune has also entered into a unique 




In 1977, Professor Mach’s interest in translational research and the potential links between 
academic research and industry materialized by the creation of Biogen in Geneva. In addition   49
to all the experience acquired through the creation of this company, Prof. Mach became 
convinced that a job as a university professor and, at the same time, as a private business man 
were fully compatible, hence creating a win-win situation for both academia and the private 
sector. This practice was in fact already fairly common to professors in the US at the time. 
 
When intellectual property is created from a university laboratory, there are generally two 
outcomes: The “traditional and standard way” of dealing with it is to valorize the discovery by 
licensing it to an industrial partner, which is the role of technology transfer offices. Or, if the 
“package” is considered worth it, a new company or spin-off from university is created. To 
note that for creating a new company, it is absolutely necessary to have a business model that 
can transfer the know-how into a sustainable business. (See figure 5-1.) 
 















Considering the package of discoveries and IP related to it, the experience with venture 
capital and the practice of starting biotechnology companies, the network in place, and the 
fact that Prof. Mach was about to retire as a professor, led to the decision to set up the 
company at the end of 1998. Among all the decisional aspects, networking takes an 
outstanding place. Referring to Prof. Mach, “networking means being able to pick up the 
phone and call any CEO of any pharma or biotech company, and trying to establish bridges, 
links and synergies”. On the other side, networking also establishes links to the financial 
community. Among the first difficulties while setting up the company was the problem of 
settling the IP issues with the university, mainly because there was still no technology transfer 
office at this time. 
 
Today, this is probably different as a lot of progress has been made in Switzerland in this 
sense over the last four years. However, this still does not mean that the academic and   
political environments are encouraging the creation of new companies. For Prof. Mach the 
goal would be that the Swiss government encourages the role of universities as a “stepping 
stone” to the creation of new enterprises. According to Prof. Mach, the difficulties that 
NovImmune was confronted with in the beginning cover all the cases of bottlenecks an 
entrepreneur encounters in Switzerland or Europe when wanting to start a company. 
 
The first bottleneck is the lack of entrepreneurship within universities. Second, there is a lack 
of encouragement from the authorities, i.e. universities and political institutions. In fact, the 
person who stays at university and has simultaneously a non-managerial advisory function 
within a company will often experience pressure and difficulties within his faculty as he is 
“flirting with business”. What is important here is to have a well defined transfer policy for   50
each institution which can be only achieved with professionalism. But besides some 
exceptions, most technology transfer offices in Switzerland are run by professors who have 
only little business expertise. Moreover, the role of technology transfer offices remains 
ambiguous: Some offices consider it their duty to get the maximum financial benefit possible 
for their university, while others make it their objective to catalyze and facilitate the creation 
of spin-offs. 
 
Another important bottleneck is the lack of “coaching structures”, that is the lack of 
incubators and other structures facilitating the foundation of a new biotechnology company. 
While the reservoir of good projects and innovation, and the absolute amount of money 
available in Switzerland do not constitute bottlenecks, one obstacle is the insufficiency of 
structures that facilitate access to seed financing. For example, in this context, the Swiss 
government should allow business angels to write off losses that could be incurred from their 
investments. But in general, fiscal conditions should be counted as a bottleneck on their own. 
In Switzerland, fiscal conditions could be improved to facilitate and encourage partners at 
different echelons, e.g. investors or companies in terms of stock-option plans, etc. 
 
A further major and specific bottleneck for biotechnology companies is space. Biotechnology 
spin-offs are extremely dependent on a very heavy infrastructure, involving expensive 
laboratories and equipments. This is also why the co-existing or sharing with university is 
extremely valid. Accessing the technology without compromising the company’s IP rights is 
crucial as IP is one of the key ingredients of a successful start-up company. By the way, 
according to Prof. Mach, the two main differences between the IT and the biotech world are 
the time frame and risk-assessment. As a consequence, the words “product” and 
“profitability” are completely foreign to a biotech start-up. 
 
An additional bottleneck is the diversity of competences and backgrounds among people 
which are required in the field of biotechnology. This is partly why one of the aspects of the 
strategy of new biotechnology companies is outsourcing. In fact, one of the rules which were 
set up during the creation of NovImmune says that whenever a problem can be solved 
elsewhere better, the company will outsource, with all its implications. This means the 
company constantly has to re-assess, and has to be flexible in shifting its priorities. 
 
The prior bottleneck directly leads to another one, which some people consider as the most 
important one: There is a key time during the maturing of a new biotechnology company 
during which it should be run by a professional manager, and not by a scientist. But there is 
an objective lack of professional managers with sufficient knowledge in the field of 
biotechnology in Switzerland, and the culture of the pharmaceutical business is totally 
different from the culture of the biotech business. 
 
The final bottleneck is the Swiss and European culture of intolerance towards failure. Without 
a fiscal and legal environment that allows an entrepreneur to start over again without penalty, 
besides psychological and financial punishment, there is no incentive to entrepreneurship. But 
“it is through failure that you learn, not through success”. (See table 5-1.) 
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Table 5-1: Seven major bottlenecks in creating a biotech company in Switzerland 
 
1
st bottleneck  Lack of entrepreneurship within universities 
2
nd bottleneck  Lack of encouragement from public authorities 
3
rd bottleneck  Lack of coaching structures (incubators, etc.) 
4
th bottleneck  Lack of space (infrastructure) 
5
th bottleneck  Diversity of competences among people required 
6
th bottleneck  Lack of professional managers with sufficient knowledge in biotech 
7
th bottleneck  Swiss and European culture of intolerance towards failure 
 
 
There is a sufficient pool of good scientists within Switzerland and outside that perfectly 
correspond to the needs of the industry. Swiss universities provide excellent training in the 
life sciences. Thus, Prof. Mach does not anticipate any difficulty in recruiting. Additionally, 
there are some very good Swiss scientists abroad that could be repatriated. Overall, medical 
research, biology, and life science research in Switzerland rank very high compared to the rest 
of the world. 
 
Concerning the SPP Biotechnology, Prof. Mach considers that the interpretation of the field of 
biotechnology was given too broad a definition for this program, including for example 
agriculture, fermentation, and machines, and not covering for example life sciences and drug 
development. Moreover, with one exception at the EPFL, there were almost only Swiss-
German universities which received funding through this program. But Prof. Mach is 
convinced that if there were another national research program in this field today, it would be 
orientated in a different way. 
 
 
5.3.2  Apotech Corporation 
 
Interview with Prof. Jürg Tschopp, Co-Founder, on December 6, 2002. 
 
Apotech Corporation, located in Epalinges/Lausanne, was founded in 2000 in Geneva. The 
company is an operating life sciences reagents company discovering, developing and 
producing new products in the field of apoptosis and inflammation research. Product offering, 
combined with technical information supports researchers in science advancement. The 





In 1996, Apotech Biochemicals SA was co-founded by Profs. Lars French (University of 
Geneva) and Jürg Tschopp (University of Lausanne). The principal motivation was to find 
extra resources for their research laboratories. Apotech started selling its products through 
Alexis, a company based in the Basel region. In 1999, Apotech’s activities, i.e. product sale 
and drug development, were split, thus creating a spin-off, named Apoxis. Today, Apotech 
Corporation continues to focus on research, and Apoxis, which took over all patents for drug 
development, sells products. In 2002, Apotech had 25 employees, with an office in the US 
and in Japan. 
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Because of the existence of an already extensive IP portfolio, the choice of top-quality 
international investors and VC (preferred to Swiss VC) was abundant, contrary to the current 
state of industry. A dense network and useful contacts also facilitated financing. Public 
support was (and will be) provided by CTI projects which contributed funds via Apoxis to 
finance researchers at Apotech.  
 
As the laboratories at the Institute of Biochemistry of the University of Lausanne (UNIL) 
started to become too small quite early, the company moved to the Biopole Lausanne Region 
which was created in 2000. Precisely, it was the Canton of Vaud that assisted in finding and 
financing land. As for access to qualified personnel, the company faced no difficulties in 
recruiting until now. 
 
Apotech holds a contract with the University of Lausanne giving a 20% discount to the 
University on all Apotech products. At the same time, the company’s researchers get all 
existing reactives at the University for free. Another important aspect: Apotech has the first 
right of refusal with regard to anything that comes out of Prof. Tschopp’s laboratory. Further 
to this contract, negotiations are undergoing between the University of Lausanne and Apoxis 
to become shareholders in the company. The basic principle is that investors invest in Apoxis, 
and Apoxis delegates basic research to the University. 
 
On the level of industry links, additionally to contracts with Hoffmann-La Roche and 
Novartis, Apotech has a contract with US-based Biogen whose leading product uses at present 
Apotech patented technology. To note that the contract between Biogen and Apotech was 
concluded before the one between Apotech and the University. In fact, referring to Prof. 
Tschopp’s experience, industry always appreciates if they can circumvent universities as 
decisions can be taken more rapidly and efficiently. 
 
Apotech has a well-defined strategy in place for IP. With respect to a contract between 
Apotech and Apoxis, all research results are forwarded to Apoxis to be patented there. In total, 
there are 15 patents today (2002). 
 
Besides its participation in a CTI project, Apotech did not take part in any other public 
programs, such as the SPP Biotechnology. Though Prof. Tschopp would prefer a team of 
small units who once a year make a tour of the Swiss biotechnology industry, and thus create 
and distribute contacts and networks, he welcomes the NCCR initiative and values the results 
of the earlier SPP Biotechnology. 
 
Prof. Tschopp is convinced that public authorities can have a big influence on the creation and 
the development of clusters; the Biopole Lausanne Region is proof of that. The problem 
consists in finding the right people to do this work, as public authorities are often risk-averse 
and lack of confidence in the success of the biotechnology sector. 
 
 
5.3.3  Laboratory of Cellular Biotechnology, CBUE (EPFL) 
 
Interview with Prof. Dr. Florian Wurm, Co-Founder of ExcellGene, on January 28, 2003. 
 
The Center of Biotechnology UNIL/EPFL (CBUE), which comprises the Laboratory of 
Cellular Biotechnology (LBTC) of Prof. Wurm, is an academic institution focusing on 
teaching and fundamental and applied research within the field of molecular and cellular   53
biotechnology. Its research and development work has a principally medical emphasis, 
applying tools for molecular biotechnology, cellular biotechnology, cell technology, process 
engineering, analytical biochemistry and downstream-recovery technologies. Several projects 
within the CBUE aim at the development of novel therapeutic and/or prophylactic products 
for human use. Due to links to external academic and commercial institutions, know-how has 
been accumulated in recombinant protein expression and the development of suitable 




In 1995, Prof. Wurm was nominated professor of biotechnology at the EPFL, while his 
colleague Nicolas Mermod was nominated professor of molecular genetics at the University 
of Lausanne. Jointly they founded the Center of Biotechnology which still exists at the EPFL, 
and which includes the Laboratories of Molecular and Cellular Biotechnology UNIL-EPFL. 
At that time, people in Switzerland started to realize that the Swiss biotech scene was lacking 
a certain emphasis, especially concerning the “modern” aspects of biotechnology. 
 
Concerning research in biotechnology, Switzerland – compared to other countries – can 
definitely offer high-quality science in basic fields, as proven by the Nobel Price in Chemistry 
2002 for Kurt Wüthrich (ETHZ). But, according to Prof. Wurm, if comparing fundamental 
research from any area which is put into use, Switzerland is far behind other countries. There 
are countries, like the US, which aggressively support biotechnology because of a clear 
conviction that this is the only economic sector that is growing. In fact, “we’re just beginning 
to see what’s possible”, even though Switzerland has not embraced this idea yet. 
 
Prof. Wurm sees insufficient lobbying in biotechnology as one major reason for this 
unsatisfactory situation in Switzerland, which is neither improved by the presence of Big 
Pharma. Also the SNSF “gave up” the SPP Biotechnology, thus closing down all applied 
research programs. This program represented an important source of funding and was 
essential for the survival of Prof. Wurm’s laboratory. Even if university has its own 
responsibility, an institute like the EPFL should not have difficulties in supporting applied 
research. Overall, Prof. Wurm estimates that the SPP Biotechnology was a “very good” 
program, mainly due to the persons in charge of it. 
 
Prof. Wurm’s laboratory maintains various links with industry, e.g. Pfizer, AstroZenica, 
Aventis, Merck, and VaxGen, a spin-off from Genentech specialized in HIV vaccines. Those 
links help for example in a significant way to overcome financial difficulties inside the 
laboratory. Another important contract has been established with the Ludwig Institute for 
Cancer Research, a not-for-profit global research organization. As the Institute encounters 
difficulties to translate its fundamental research into reality, Prof. Wurm’s laboratory supports 
moving some of its products into the pipeline for clinical evaluation. 
 
Even though the constraints from industry are very high with respect to IP, Prof. Wurm’s 
laboratory produces approximately 30 scientific papers per year. This implies dealing with the 
restrictions imposed by industry, which is very protective of its IP, on the one side, and the 
need to publish as a professor on the other. With regard to IP registration the laboratory 
usually files for patents if there might be a commercial potential for it. The problem here is 
that in the field of biotechnology, a patent may not have a real value for several years, due to 
long patent granting procedures. So although the EPFL supports the idea of filing patents, the 
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office in charge often does not have enough money to sustain those patents. As a consequence, 
Prof. Wurm is more concerned about running his laboratory and being productive than filing 
patents. 
 
According to Prof. Wurm, technology transfer is still lacking experience at the EPFL, though 
it is extremely important to know how to “sell” good ideas. For example, Prof. Wurm is co-
founder and scientific advisor of a spin-off from his own laboratory, called ExcellGene. As 
the costs of taking licenses are high, and as the company did not go for “big money” and VC 
(as too risky), it was decided to slowly buid up the company. At this stage, ExcellGene is 
planning a move to the Biopole Monthey (Valais) in the near future. 
 
Although the last referendums in Switzerland related to life sciences (e.g., GMOs) turned out 
positively, the attitude among the public opinion is still tense. In fact, there is not a single 
politician in Switzerland who publicly supports biotechnology or declares his dissatisfaction 
with Big Pharma which rarely creates new jobs. That’s why for Prof. Wurm, political will is 
still lacking in Switzerland. 
 
 
5.3.4  Department of Medical Biochemistry, University of Geneva 
 
Interview with Prof. Dr. Robin Offord, Co-Director of the Department of Medical 
Biochemistry and Former Medical Faculty’s President of Pre-Clinical Medicine, on February 
26, 2003. 
 
The Department of Medical Biochemistry of the University of Geneva School of Medicine is 
located in the “Centre Médical Universitaire” (CMU). Part of the section for Basic Medical 





Prof. Offord co-created altogether four biotechnology companies in the US and Switzerland. 
He was co-founder of the Californian-based start-up which divided to become Gryphon 
Sciences (re-branded as Gryphon Therapeutics) and Ciphergen Biosystems. Founded in the 
“classical Californian way” with insufficient VC, the first difficulty was to get a lead investor. 
One of the reasons for establishing the company in California was the origin of one of the 
three scientific founders. Moreover, no institutional discouragement was encountered. On the 
other hand, Geneva or Zurich were less enthusiastic about welcoming the company. Public 
help was proposed in Switzerland, but in the end no deal took place. 
 
Prof. Offord has been a director of Geneva Bioinformatics SA (GeneBio). The mission in 
mind at the creation of this company was to assemble world-wide data on proteins in a 
systematic way. This knowledge base then became SWISS-PROT. After a first failure of 
applying for funding to the European Union (EU), support was finally granted by the 
University of Geneva, private industry, and the EU. Today, SWISS-PROT is an equal 
partnership between the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) and the Swiss 
Institute of Bioinformatics (SIB). One major issue during the foundation of the company 
concerned the access modalities for private companies and academia to the data base. In fact, 
the explicit mixing of business and academic issues was a true problem for the University of 
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Geneva at this time. Another important issue was the complexity of the IP – non-existing in 
the beginning – as it was public domain. 
 
In 2000-2001, before returning to his University post, Prof. Offord was founding President 
and Executive Vice-Chairman of Geneva Proteomics, Inc. (GeneProt). GeneProt evolved out 
of decade-long academic research and was created during the bubble of 2000, which 
facilitated the attraction of important institutional and strategic investors from the US and 
Europe, including Switzerland. Furthermore, the company received support from the 
University of Geneva and several cantonal and federal authorities, which helped to overcome 
the problem of, e.g., working permits and location. 
 
For IP protection, licensing agreements and a cash investment, a 5% equity share was granted 
to the University of Geneva. Moreover, to fully respect public interests, Prof. Offord’s salary 
as a professor was repaid to the University. Overall, there were very few obstacles that 
occurred during the foundation of GeneProt. The only exception for Prof. Offord is the 
existence of the capital tax. As the grant of share options, necessary if recruiting worldwide, 
constitutes an additional income, individuals are taxed on their annual value. But even though 
on the other side there is no capital gain tax, Prof. Offord considers that “institutional factors 
are against entrepreneurship in Switzerland”. 
 
While recruiting is generally a difficult task, the Swiss education system is qualified as 
excellent by Prof. Offord, especially for technicians. On the other hand, it seems that 
Switzerland as a whole, but also Europe, is “uncomfortable with excellence” in a certain way: 
therefore, losses like the one of Biogen have to be avoided. And GeneProt is already 
incorporated in Delaware… 
 
 
5.4 Other  locations 
 
5.4.1 EUROPROTEOME  AG 
 
Interview with Dr. Silvano Cometta, Project Manager, on November 19, 2003. 
 
EUROPROTEOME AG – the Human Cancer Company – is a product-focused 
biopharmaceutical firm focusing on R&D and product development in the area of epithelial 
cancers. Founded and initially located in Geneva, the company is now based in the Biotech-
Bogen at Hennigsdorf/Germany (near Berlin). EUROPROTEOME’s mission is to provide the 
oncology market with diagnostic and prognostic products, patient-specific therapies, and 
immunological tools. 
In its research, EUROPROTEOME applies proteome technology to human epithelial cancers 
in order to identify specific gene expression patterns. Since 1997, the company has set up one 
of the world’s largest human tumor sample banks and cancer networks consisting of clinical 
and scientific researchers from various research institutes and clinics. Its patented sample 




EUROPROTEOME is the result of research cooperation among different universities in 
Europe, led by the University of Geneva. Because of IP-related difficulties, the company was 
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set up with the researchers as shareholders and indirectly also IP holders. Accordingly, the IP 
presented the starting point for setting up the company what was initially done for legal 
reasons, i.e. with no offices and no employees. 
 
To receive public and private financing for the effective starting of the company in 
Switzerland, different attempts have been made. Assistance through the CTI Start-up initiative 
turned out to be too slow and not responsive enough. A certain familiarity with and an interest 
in the technology in question were also missing. Moreover, the company was not looking for 
any collaboration (with academia) at this time, but basically for financing. Contacts in view of 
local financing with the Cantons of Vaud and Geneva, the University of Lausanne and the 
EPFL didn’t work out either. As a result, EUROPROTEOME looked abroad for public 
financial support, and moved finally to Hennigsdorf/Germany because of better support from 
regional authorities in looking for offices, laboratories, personnel, tax breaks, etc. Such a 
stimulus is missing in Switzerland. 
 
In September 2001 EUROPROTEOME closed its first institutional financing round which 
provided the company with additional resources of € 9.5 million. Currently, 
EUROPROTEOME is aiming to raise further equity funding in its second institutional 
financing round. Overall, Dr. Cometta is not satisfied with the situation in Switzerland 
concerning access to capital as there is a general aversion to risk-taking, a reluctance to 
provide financing, and a certain lack of dynamism. As VC companies in Switzerland showed 
little interest in biotechnology during its first financing round (as they were more interested in 
IT at this time), EUROPROTEOME decided to go abroad. 
 
In Germany, access to qualified personnel is not considered a problem. The quality of 
education in Switzerland is adequate but improvements could be done on the post-doc level. 
In addition, there is a general need for more bioinformaticians. It seems that Switzerland is 
going downright path but there is a lack of entrepreneurial spirit among post-doc graduates. 
Yet the latter is a common phenomena known also by other countries. 
 
Concerning links with academia, EUROPROTEOME is involved in a large network of 
researchers which precisely constituted the basis for the foundation of the company. Co-
developmental research represents a key element of this network which consists at the 
moment of a close community of 50 people. By the way, the parties involved in this 
collaboration are called “clinical cancer network”. There is cooperation with different 
universities on research projects, while sharing technologies, tests, and patient samples. 
Moreover, regular seminars at EUROPROTEOME with university professors help to discuss 
future developments and projects. In the case of links with industry, there is technological 
cooperation with several companies. But EUROPROTEOME is also looking into contacts 
with Big Pharma (cancer research) for co-development and out-licensing of technology. 
 
As already referred to, IP issues are fundamental for a biopharmaceutical company like 
EUROPROTEOME. Also if not managed correctly, IP becomes a problem. In particular, 
EUROPROTEOME faced a certain lack of professionalism of Swiss technology transfer 
offices and university which were not able to provide valuable advice at the time. Public 
opinion has a high influence on the whole biotechnology sector. New laws and referendums, 
for example in the field of GMOs and animal testing, could threaten the livelihood of Swiss 
companies which may eventually be forced to relocate. In general, there is a need to better 
inform the public and the media, which is the responsibility of government, industry and 
universities.   57
EUROPROTEOME tried to participate in different Swiss and European research programs, 
but none of them concluded. In Germany, the company was involved in several programs on 
different projects providing non-repayable funds. These funds then allow to do less applied 
research, thus focusing more on projects that might in a later stage lead to product 
development. A suggestion from Dr. Cometta to Swiss institutions managing research 
programs would be for example to exchange experiences with their counterparts in Germany 
as they need to become more efficient, i.e. asking for less paperwork, decreasing the time 
consumption for companies, etc. 
 
The implantation of EUROPROTEOME in Germany did not cause any major difficulties, 
mainly because public authorities are working with an experienced private investment 
promotion agency (IIC). Switzerland also needs experienced people with charisma to attract 
people and companies to the cantons and clusters in biotechnology. 
 
 
5.4.2  ZLB Bioplasma AG 
 
Interview with Dr. Hanspeter Amstutz, Research and Development, on December 2, 2002. 
 
Founded in 1949 as a department of the Swiss Red Cross (SRC), ZLB Bioplasma AG in Berne 
is one of the world’s leading pharmaceutical companies specializing in the manufacture of 
plasma products. Employing about 750 people, ZLB develops and produces drugs from 
human plasma for international markets. Since 2000, ZLB Bioplasma AG is a subsidiary of 





ZLB is involved in numerous networks with academia. The company is collaborating with the 
University of Berne where a research group is funded by ZLB at the Inselspital Berne 
(University Hospital). In case of “need for collaboration”, research is also done together with 
the University’s Department of chemistry and biochemistry. There is also a scientist from 
ZLB teaching at the medical faculty of the University of Berne. Another member of ZLB’s 
knowledge network is the Pasteur Institute in Paris with which the company maintains 
collaborative links. 
 
In the framework of a CTI project, ZLB is collaborating with the ETHZ and Berna Biotech 
AG in Berne. As a rule, it is extremely important to conclude a general agreement before 
beginning any kind of collaboration. For example, the Anti-D-project which started around 
1995 went through different obstacles. First, the university and professor in question were not 
interested in creating a commercial product. Second, Unitectra asked to pay royalties to the 
university but which would have had a deconstructive effect on the whole project. For Dr. 
Amstutz, Unitectra, being too strongly focused on concrete outputs and products, put the 
hurdle too high, hence making itself less interesting for the private sector. For ZLB, the large 
network inside the CSL Group represents unquestionably a big advantage for any kind of 
commercial collaboration. Public opinion seems to be less of a concern for ZLB as the 
company’s biotechnology research unit is located in Melbourne (Australia). 
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ZLB participated in the SPP Biotechnology for around four years (1997-2001). The joint 
research project with the EPFL proved to be very successful. Antibodies have been produced, 
and the product has been taken to clinical phase which probably couldn’t have been realized 
as fast within the company. 
 
The participation in the program finally came to an end when the technology transfer office of 
the University of Lausanne (Pactt) raised the charges for laboratory-time provided by the 
University and the EPFL. Moreover, due to the low productivity in cell culture creation at the 
University, CSL (Melbourne) is planning on taking over this procedure. 
 
Overall, contacts, meetings, reports, but also getting students in contact with practical work, 
were the main side-products of the participation in the program. Or, to summarize, thanks to 
the program, academia and industry were brought together. At present, ZLB is developing 







































The aim of this study is to give a qualitative overview of the Swiss biotechnology scene while 
focusing on knowledge networks and institutional factors which influence the competitiveness 
of biopharmaceutical activities in Switzerland. The issues we tried to explore first during our 
interviews with key actors active in the field of biopharmaceuticals, either from the private 
sector or academia, were of a general nature: we were studying the general circumstances of 
the creation of a biotech company (public support, financing, access to qualified personnel, 
university education and training, company location) or, in case of a public institution, its 
contribution to the development of biotechnology in Switzerland. Second, we were interested 
in the knowledge network the company or public institution is involved in, i.e. its existing 
links with other private companies (e.g., strategic alliances) or research institutions. It was 
shown that clustering constitutes a natural means of organization among actors in the 
biopharmaceutical field. In this context we were also interested in the different factors 
favoring or inhibiting cooperation between Swiss universities and industry. Third, we were 
looking at the institutional factors affecting biotechnology in Switzerland, that is IP related 
issues, the availability and access to capital, and the influence of the general public opinion on 
regulatory conditions. Finally, we wanted to know about the benefits of public research 
promotion programs (e.g., SPP Biotechnology, CTI projects), and how cantonal and/or 
municipal authorities in Switzerland can be instrumental in the creation of biotechnology 
clusters at certain sites. 
 
 
6.1  Starting a company 
 
Normally, the creation of a biotech company goes back to the research results found at 
university or inside the R&D unit of a large multinational biopharmaceutical company. 
Together with existing links with academia and industry, the knowledge accumulated during 
those research activities often represents the basis for the creation of a new spin-off or start-up 
company. Even though the high quality of science conducted in Switzerland is clearly 
recognized by all concerned actors, the effective transfer of technology is generally lacking. 
In adequate measures of lobbying by Big Pharma or the SNSF might be one explanation for 
this situation. 
 
Public support, e.g. looking for offices, laboratories, personnel, tax reductions (breaks) etc., 
for the creation of new companies generally exists but is less institutionalized in Switzerland, 
e.g. in form of incubators, than in other countries such as the United States or Germany, for 
example. Several actors consider the assistance provided by the CTI (CTI Start-up label, CTI 
projects, etc.) as not reactive and responsive enough. Moreover, its support is not sufficiently 
constructive and should be more directly oriented. Thus, there is a common understanding 
that the most appropriate infrastructure for a biotech start-up is the university, though its role 
as a stepping stone into business is rarely encouraged by the Swiss government. Support 
through university technology transfer offices, especially in the field of IP issues, is getting 
more and more professional, but is still behind the US or other European countries. 
 
Networking and broad contacts are the basis for accessing capital. As there is no big venture 
capital company in Switzerland, financing is more complicated and clearly becomes the first 
hurdle to clear for any emerging company. In general, the existence of an already extensive IP 
portfolio or the collaboration with a big biopharmaceutical company facilitates the access to   60
Swiss and international VC, but it still remains difficult to find investors without excessively 
stringent requirements. Besides private resources which remain an important source of 
funding, the Novartis Venture Fund or the Venture business plan competition, for example, 
represent two major fund suppliers for start-up and spin-off companies in the field of life 
sciences in Switzerland. 
 
Even though there is a sufficient pool of highly skilled scientists in Switzerland, access to 
qualified personnel is not always easy. Hence, existing links with university can be extremely 
helpful in finding academic scientists or Swiss researchers coming back from abroad choosing 
to work for a private company. The quality of education in the field of life sciences is 
commonly regarded as excellent. Improvements might be necessary on the post-doc level. 
Although it might not be the responsibility of the university to produce “tailor-made” 
graduates, a lack of entrepreneurial spirit among post-doc graduates is usually recognized by 
all actors. But this problem is also well known in other European countries. 
 
Companies are principally located in one of the three major clusters of biotechnology, i.e. in 
the greater Basel region, the greater Zurich region, and the Lake of Geneva region 
(Lausanne/Geneva). The reasons advanced for locating in one of these clusters are normally 
the same: the availability of space, access to top-class laboratories, the creation of networks, 
establishing links and synergies with already located companies, and accordingly the 
exchange of personnel and facility sharing. This infrastructure, in close proximity to an 
academic institution, offers the most favorable conditions to every biotech company. The 
exclusive pharmaceutical environment of Basel, and hence the easy access to top skills from 
all over the world, makes Basel particularly attractive for the biotech industry. 
 
 
6.2  Clusters and knowledge networks 
 
Commonly, clusters are understood as a basis for useful interactions and synergies between 
companies, offering a favorable environment and infrastructure to biopharmaceutical 
companies. Even though effects of congestion have to be taken into account, positive aspects 
generally prevail in clusters, therefore supporting their natural creation. A sound network 
between industry and academia, emphasized through geographic proximity, constitutes an 
important asset for every company, and may even present the basis for the creation of a new 
biotech company as in the case of EUROPROTEOME AG. The various interactions with 
academia or public research institutes and active links with SMEs or pharmaceutical 
multinationals can take different forms and are driven by different needs. Technological 
cooperation, product development, in-licensing from or license agreements with Big Pharma 
(allowing royalties to be received), diploma works or post-doctoral studies, are just a few 
examples for networking among a biotech company and its strategic environment. A huge 
array of alliances with SMEs and multinationals and key acquisitions in the case of Big 
Pharma are useful instruments to broaden the range and to fortify the position of a company. 
An already existing network within a group of companies is an additional advantage for 
commercial collaborations. 
 
While for many companies academia presents an important partner for new ideas, universities 
get access to practical experience through their ties to industry. Moreover, basic research 
delegated to university by a private company or, for example, moving products of a public 
research institute into the pipeline for clinical evaluation are two possibilities to obtain 
external financing for a university laboratory. In general, even though regulations are in place   61
for university-industry collaborations, especially concerning IP issues, it is important to 
establish a common agreement before any kind of collaboration. Many projects initially 
started out as university projects constitute a starting point for further collaborative research 
among a private company and university on a contract basis, with an IP share regulated 
individually for each project. The ultimate step for the university is then to become 
shareholder in the company as practiced already by several universities in Switzerland. It 
seems however that creating links with university, often based on personal contacts, becomes 
more and more difficult as private companies have become more risk-averse in recent years. 
Additionally, the industry is unhappy with the slow and inefficient decision-making common 
in academic institutions. Finally, the awareness of how to handle university-industry 




6.3  Institutional factors 
 
Like it is the case for any high-tech company, IP related issues are of fundamental and 
strategic importance for every biopharmaceutical company. Constituting a start-up company’s 
currency, a well-defined IP strategy and the professionalism of IP management become key 
ingredients for each company. Even though a lot of progress has been made in Switzerland 
since the end of the nineties there is still a general lack of experience and support in this 
domain. Indeed, university technology transfer offices still need to acquire more practice in 
how to sell good ideas. On the other side, academia generally complains about the different 
views between universities and industry: While industry tries to patent as much as possible, 
university professors are under permanent pressure to publish. Although university 
laboratories usually file for patents if there might be a commercial potential in view, 
university technology transfer offices are most often confronted with limited resources. Thus, 
it is not surprising that a university professor is more concerned about running his own 
laboratory than filing patents. Concerning IP regulation, while no major handicap or 
substantial difference is seen in Switzerland with regard to the US or other countries, IP 
harmonization on a European level seems to be nevertheless of vital concern for the whole 
sector. 
 
While capital is generally abundant in Switzerland, access to it is more problematic. The 
general aversion to risk-taking in Switzerland (and Europe) in comparison to the US, the 
reluctance to provide financing, and a general lack of dynamism among investors make it 
particularly difficult for an emerging company to find capital. Additionally, the absence of a 
big venture capital company in Switzerland and the recent economic downturn make it even 
more complicated for new biotech start-ups to access capital. Hence, the quality of a business 
plan and a dense, qualified network become key assets for each company. Venture 
competitions or the CTI Start-up label may improve this network and qualify a company for 
VC investment. Finally, technical expertise by Swiss investors in the field of biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals is commonly considered as good, constituting an important criterion of 
selection for VC. 
 
On the whole, the public opinion plays a very important role in the field of life sciences. This 
is particularly true for a country with such a high degree of direct democracy like Switzerland. 
Overly restrictive laws and the ratification of limiting referendums may threaten the business 
of Swiss biopharmaceutical companies. But unlike universities and hospitals, companies and 
biotech venture funds have the possibility to leave a country and to relocate. For example,   62
concerning GMOs, Switzerland and Europe as a whole stand to lose out to the US as there is a 
big difference in perception between the Old and the New World. To create mutual trust 
between the public and industry, and to better inform the public and media about sensitive 
issues, more communication is necessary. Bringing the life sciences into schools and colleges 
would allow to inform and help educate a wide audience from early on. In this case, more 
partners would be needed, involving government, industry and academia. An initiative which 
already went in this direction was the creation of the BICS office in Basel during the SPP 
Biotechnology. Its aim is the steady information of the public on biotech issues, including 
ethical and safety aspects. The creation of a Swiss life sciences organization might be a 
further step in this direction. Even though the biopharmaceutical industry is dependent on the 
public opinion, it should be able to keep its independence. Finally, considering the delicate 
attitude in this domain, a clear political willingness to support biotechnology in Switzerland 
might help soothe the present situation for all involved actors, the public included. 
 
 
6.4  Public support 
 
Public funding is fundamental, as every young company needs support. One possibility of 
receiving public support is the participation in research promotion programs. The most 
renowned program in Switzerland in the field of life sciences so far, in terms of its impact, 
was the SPP Biotechnology. This program is considered as having been the first instrument 
which allowed an effective collaboration in the field of biotechnology between industry and 
academia in Switzerland. Moreover, the program was able to further advance research in 
biotechnology and to encourage the creation of new biotech companies, mainly thanks to its 
in-house evaluation of Swiss biotechnology allowing to positively influence the general 
public perception. 
 
Besides the companies which were directly created through the SPP Biotechnology, the 
companies participating directly or indirectly in the program through projects were generally 
satisfied with its results. All involved actors, either from academia or industry, mainly SMEs, 
saw a clear improvement in bridging the gap between industry and academia. Networking on 
an industrial but also political level, the institutionalization of technology transfer (Unitectra) 
and, for example, familiarizing students with the realities of entrepreneurship were just some 
of the positive by-products of the program. But also several critics have emerged during the 
program: First, some actors regretted its character of funding research in a “top-down” way, 
hence clearly preferring a bottom-up approach. Second, for some actors the interpretation of 
“biotechnology” was too broad, including many aspects of the “old” biotechnology revolving 
around fermentations, antibiotic production, baking and brewing. Finally, while some actors 
complain about the absence of an extension of the program after 2001, its former Program 
Director sees no abrupt termination as there is a continuation on other levels. 
 
An alternative to the SPP Biotechnology might be the introduction of the NCCRs in Life 
Sciences. Though this program is not application-orientated at all as it was the case of the SPP, 
it includes research and educational aspects, but also knowledge and technology transfer 
issues. But critics regret the investment of important amounts of public money into networks, 
preferring to focus on particular research issues. Another well-known alternative to the SPP 
and NCCR initiative, is the CTI. Many companies try to get access to research funding 
through CTI projects, or try to obtain the CTI Start-up label qualifying a company for VC 
investment. Moreover, both possibilities can initiate collaboration between private companies 
and academia. The Universities of Applied Sciences (HES), fostered by the CTI, offer an   63
alternative as a valuable partner for application-orientated research. Finally, European 
research programs may also constitute an alternative on an international level for companies 
and universities. 
 
There is a general understanding among all actors that clustering in biotechnology can be 
positively influenced by the public authorities. Thus it is even more surprising that almost all 
major biotech clusters in Switzerland result mainly from private initiatives (e.g., Biotech 
Center Zurich-Schlieren). To efficiently support clusters, and to successfully attract people 
and companies to the cantons and biotech clusters, professional and experienced people are 
necessary. However, to facilitate clustering and to provide positive general conditions, 
measures of intervention by the public authorities should be flexible and not too direct. For 
example, instead of creating additional commissions or institutions, local governments should 
facilitate the access to already existing clusters and should help in obtaining working permits 
for high-skilled workers from abroad. With its traditional links to France and Germany, and 
given its historical dominance in the biopharmaceutical sector, the Basel region could be the 
ideal place to promote. On the other hand, the success of formal network initiatives is put into 
question as young companies normally need direct access to adequate working facilities. 
That’s why those initiatives should be more dynamic in pro-active support and the promotion 





Overall, biotechnology in Switzerland can be considered a serious competitor to other 
countries active in biotechnology. Nevertheless, improvements should be made on several 
levels. Public authorities should stimulate the creation of clusters and support the foundation 
of new companies more efficiently. Technology transfer is still lacking and access to capital, 
while abundant, needs to be facilitated. Though institutional factors are generally good, the 
Swiss tax system could become more favorable for private companies. Moreover, considering 
the importance of the public opinion in Switzerland, a clear political commitment in favor of 
biotechnology in Switzerland could give a further boost to this promising industry. Finally, to 
avoid a delocalisation of Swiss biopharmaceutical companies to the US, Switzerland needs to 
learn how to embrace excellence – clearly present in this country. Hence, concluding a 
strategic alliance with a Swiss biotech company or moving to one of the three major clusters 























AG    Incorporated company (in German: Aktiengesellschaft) 
ASBC   Association of Swiss Biotechnology Companies 
BATS   Center for Biosafety Assessment, Technology and Sustainability 
BFIT    Board of the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology 
BICS   Biotechnology  Information and Communication Switzerland 
CATI    Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (MERIT) 
CBUE   Laboratory of Cellular Biotechnology (EPFL) 
CEO    Chief executive officer 
CERS   Commission for the Encouragement of Scientific Research 
CEST    Centre for Science and Technology Studies 
CFO    Chief financial officer 
CHUV   Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois 
CMU    Centre Médical Universitaire (University of Geneva) 
CSO    Chief scientific officer 
CTI    Commission for Technology and Innovation 
DNA   Desoxyribo  Nucleic  Acid 
DTI    Department of Trade and Industry (Great Britain) 
EMBL   European Molecular Biology Laboratory 
EPO    European Patent Office 
ESA    European Space Agency 
EPFL   Federal  Institute of Technology Lausanne 
ETHZ   Federal Institute of Technology Zurich 
EU   European  Union 
EUREKA European  Research  and Coordination Agency 
Eurostat  Statistical Office of the European Communities 
FIT    Federal Institute of Technology 
FOES    Federal Office for Education and Science 
FOPET  Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology 
GmbH   Limited liability company (in German: Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) 
GMO   Genetically  modified  organism 
HES    University of Applied Sciences 
HIV    Human immunodeficiency virus 
ICT    Information and communications technology 
IIP    Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property 
IMS   Intelligent  Manufacturing  Systems 
IP   Intellectual  property 
IPO    Initial public offering 
IRC    Increasing returns to coalition 
IPR    Intellectual property rights 
ISREC   Swiss Institute for Experimental Cancer Research 
IT   Information  technology 
LAU    Federal Act of Financial Assistance to Universities 
LBTC   Laboratory of Cellular Biotechnology   65
LLC    Limited liability company 
MERIT  Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (CATI) 
MMV    Medicines for Malaria Venture (WHO) 
NCCR   National Centre of Competence in Research 
NIS   National  innovation  system 
NSIOD  National Science Indicators on Diskette 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFIAMT  Office fédéral de l’industrie, des arts et métiers et du travail 
PPP   Purchasing  power  parity 
PSI    Paul Scherer Institute 
R&D    Research and development 
SA    Incorporated company (in French: Société actionnaire) 
SFOPH  Swiss Federal Office of Public Health 
SFSO    Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
SIB    Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics 
SME    Small and medium-sized enterprise 
SNSF    Swiss National Science Foundation 
SRP   Strategic  research  partnership 
SPP    Swiss priority program 
SRC    Swiss Red Cross 
SSA    Swiss Science Agency 
SSTC    Swiss Science and Technology Council 
S&T   Science  and  technology 
SUC    Swiss University Conference 
TLO   Technology  licensing  office 
UNIL    University of Lausanne 
USPTO  United States Patent and Trademark Office 
USTR   Office of the United States Trade Representative 
VC   Venture  capital 
VSBU   see ASBC 
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QUESTIONNAIRE : PRIVATE COMPANIES 
 
 
  What are the principal activities of your company? 
o  Annual turnover 
o  Number of employees 
o  Importance of R&D activities 
  Can you describe your academic and professional accomplishments prior  
          to the foundation of the company? 
 
 
1  Creation of the company: 
1.1 How was your company created? (Origin, motivation, etc.)? 
1.2 Can you discuss the following issues that you dealt with prior to or during the creation 
of the company?  
1.2.1  Support from public institutions 
1.2.2  Financing issues (seed capital, venture capital, etc.) 
1.2.3  Access to qualified personnel 
1.2.4  Strategic choice of company's location 
1.2.5  Regulatory constraints 
 
2  Knowledge networking: 
2.1 Can you describe the existing links, if any, between your company and other research 
institutes, in particular universities, active in the domain of biotechnology? 
(Technology transfer through licensing, collaborative research projects, exchange of 
personnel, exchange of information, etc.) 
2.2 Can you describe the existing links, if any, between your company and other private 
companies active in high-tech (strategic alliances, etc.)? Distinguish between Big 
Pharma companies and other venture businesses. 
2.3 What are the factors favouring (or inhibiting) the cooperation between Swiss 
universities and industry, in the field of biotechnology? 
2.4 In your opinion, does the quality of university education today correspond to the needs 
of the biotech industry? 
 
3  Institutional factors: 
3.1 What do you think of the current condition of intellectual property (IP) regulation in 
the biotechnology sector in Switzerland (opinion, limits, compared to US/EU laws)? 
3.2 What is your company's strategy with regard to IP? Its strategic importance? 
3.3 What do you think of the availability of (and access to) capital in Switzerland? 
3.4 In your opinion, to what extent can the general public in Switzerland influence the 
economic and regulatory conditions of the biotech industry? 
 
4  Research promotion programs: 
4.1 Have you participated (or are you currently engaging) in research promotion programs 
(e.g., SPP Biotechnology, CTI projects, etc.), and/or European programs? 
4.2 If yes, how did these programs contribute to the success of your business? 
4.3 In your opinion, did the SPP Biotechnology encourage the rapprochement between 
Swiss universities and the biotech industry?  
4.4 According to your experience, to what extent can cantonal and/or municipal 
authorities in Switzerland be instrumental in the creation of biotechnology "clusters" 
at certain sites? 








1  Biotechnology: 
 
1.1 What are the defining moments that have marked the emergence and the development 
of biotechnology in Switzerland? 
1.2 What was the contribution of your institution to this emergence? 
1.3 What are the respective contributions of universities and private companies? 
 
2  Knowledge network: 
 
2.1 Can you describe the existing links, if any, between your institution and Swiss 
universities active in the domain of biotechnology?  
2.2 Can you describe the existing links, if any, between your institution and private 
companies active in high-tech?  
2.3 What are the factors favouring (or inhibiting) the cooperation between Swiss 
universities and industry, in the field of biotechnology? 
 
3  Institutional factors: 
 
3.1 How do you judge the availability of capital, and the access thereto (seed-capital, 
venture capital, etc.) in the Swiss financial market? 
3.2 How do you see intellectual property (IP) regulation in the biotechnology sector in 
Switzerland? 
3.3 In your opinion, to what extent can the general public in Switzerland influence the 
economic and regulatory conditions in the biotech field? 
 
4  Research promotion programs: 
 
4.1 Have you participated (or are you currently engaging) in research promotion programs 
(e.g., SPP Biotechnology, CTI projects, etc.), and/or European programs? 
4.2 If yes, what was the responsibility of your institution? 
4.3 In your opinion, did the SPP Biotechnology encourage the rapprochement between 
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